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CONSERVATIVE—LIBERAL—SOCIALIST

Sir Andrew Macphail

WORDS remain long after they are empty of meaning and their virtue gone out from them. The present writing is an essay in ancient history to inquire into the pristine meaning of the terms Conservative and Liberal; and more strictly what the growing vitality of Socialism may in the future mean.

I

There is a sound basis in human nature for the Conservative and Liberal ideas. There are men who by temperament and training will hold fast to that which has been tried, who will rather endure present ills than fly to others that they know not of. These are the Conservatives. There are also men more adventurous, who have little dread of change, who have so clear a perception of present ills, they think they cannot be made worse, and a pathetic hope that they can be improved by some common action. These are the Liberals.

When sensible people holding these opposing opinions unite to make them to prevail, then two parties are formed. A contest compels both sides to approach a middle ground, since neither the one nor the other can prevail extremely. A compromise between extremes is the result. That is the essence of political wisdom, since neither can be precisely right or precisely wrong; and the modified folly of the two is likely to be of more value than the wisdom of the one. For good or ill, that is the system which the genius of our inherited British institutions has foreordained. As the two parties approach, they become confused; they lose their principles and

their identity. A new man with a new principle comes upon the scene. That is the genesis of the Socialist.

The Conservatives as a party are quite modern. Lord Hugh Cecil assigns the origin to May 6, 1790, when the House of Commons went into committee upon the Quebec Bill, establishing a constitution for Canada. Burke arose to speak, when a violent scene occurred. He broke off his political alliance with Fox; and this involved a rupture of the intimate and affectionate personal relations that existed between them. The subject was the French Revolution, the first sign of a great movement that is yet in progress. Men, he declared, must stand for, or against it; and with the cry that he had sacrificed private friendship for the safety of his country, modern political history began, and the Conservative party was born, although it did not receive a name until forty years later.

There were, of course, liberals and conservatives before Burke's time. In early life he himself behaved as a Whig, opposed to the growing power of the Crown and to war against the colonies in revolt; but he was driven by force of inherent conservative conviction to the Tory side. Pitt in his imperialism was really a dissentient Whig, and Fox, who was Tory enough for George III and North, was henceforth a confessed Whig, in favour of the French Revolution.

England has always been conservative. As Cecil says, the best way to recommend a novelty to the people is to make them believe that it is merely a revival. The barons resisted John on the ground that he was a liberal striving for change. Magna Charta merely formulated and reaffirmed the ancient laws and customs of the realm. Great events and powerful emotions are required to compel men to define themselves. The Reformation

aligned More and Norfolk on one side, Cromwell and Cranmer on the other. The Stuarts widened the breach. Royalists and Catholics were firmly arrayed against Puritans and Republicans. But above all these conflicting loyalties, loyalty to England always arose triumphant. Patriotism was deeper than religion, as Pope and Spaniard were slow to discover. Marlborough deserted the king rather than imperil the safety of his country.

It is only in times of great human activity that all phases of the political spirit are observed, when men for the occasion form themselves into parties, when parties combine and dissolve—in England with some kind of order as a result, in France as the chaos of the revolution. At such times great historical characters emerge, cast up by the convulsion or impelled by forces inherent in themselves. As examples, the times of Elizabeth, Cromwell, Pitt, and Napoleon will serve; and on a smaller stage in Canada, the strife for responsible government which ended with the confederation of the colonies. Compared with those vast disturbances, our present discontent is nothing more than the lassitude that marks the end of a wasting fever. Certainly, we did waste; we had a high fever; we are now depressed.

Of all the persons mentioned those succeeded according as they were moderate conservative reformers with a tinge of socialism; they failed according as they were extreme liberals, radicals, and whatever in those days was the equivalent of the Socialists. Elizabeth had to fight on both sides, now with Papist, then with Puritan; the one with the aid of parliament, the other with the help of the Church. Throne and Church were finally forced into an alliance, and both went down before Cromwell and the Puritans. Those "saints" in turn were destroyed by their own violence, and Charles I arose to the dubious

place of saint and martyr. The breach was closed at the restoration of Charles II by his extreme neutrality; he cared for neither personal nor political saintliness. The subsequent struggle between Whig and Tory, between reformation and rebellion, under William, Anne, and the three Georges, is the commonplace of every history book.

The followers of the middle way always triumphed. Henry VIII attempted it, like many later Conservatives, using the cry of reform for his own sordid purposes, striving to magnify the Crown at the expense of the Papacy, and to establish a church that was neither Catholic nor Protestant. Edward VI and Mary abandoned the middle way of compromise and failed; but it was resumed with success when Elizabeth came to the throne. Politics is based upon the possible. Practice changes; principles remain.

The Liberals, too, are of ancient lineage. Their first convention was held in the cave of Adullam. Four hundred delegates were present, and they included every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented. In the more modern stage of their existence, they were animated, or rather inflamed, by loftier aims, and pathetically hopeful of the ease with which they might be achieved. The Chartists of 1838 demanded nothing more than universal suffrage, vote by ballot, annual parliaments, equal electoral divisions, payment of members, who need not own property; and yet in 1909, after all these and other concessions had been obtained, Mr. J. A. Hobson is heard to declare that Liberalism has come to a crisis, and he catalogues faithfully the opposing Conservative forces.

These include every weapon in the constitutional, legal, electoral, and educational armoury; every art of menace, cajolery, and corruption; the party machine, the

landlord, the liquor trade, finance, the press, the pulpit, society, sport, and the army. Will Liberalism, he asks, reformed and dedicated to the new, enlarged, and positive task of realizing liberty, carry its adherents with unbroken ranks along the march of social progress? The answer is, It did not. Whenever the Liberals gained power, they took into their hands as many as they could of those very Conservative weapons, and they perished by them. They were not destroyed by any power from any Conservative heaven; they were undermined by the Socialists from below.

Mr. Hobson then cites the more urgent needs: the public use of land, of transport and credit, free education, equal access to public law, an effective democracy. This equal opportunity to live a good and happy life is practicable Socialism; quite different, he protests, from theoretic Socialism which, according to his description, is nothing less than Communism. He covers the whole range of human life in his system; even the shirker, the loafer, the tramp, the criminal must have a place under this new and true social responsibility. The Liberals allow the Conservatives to pay the cost of this new world; the Socialist says all men ought to work and pay; the Communist, who is only an extreme Socialist, says they will be made to exercise their inalienable right to work, and he will see that they do it. The Conservatives protest that the whole earth will not yield the price; and to compel men to work is a virtual slavery worse than the liberty to remain idle and starve to death. Liberty and death are then not the alternatives of Patrick Henry, but one and the same.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald makes bitter and just complaint against the stupid and dishonest persons who commit the heinous offence of confusing Socialists with

Communists, slandering Socialism by circulating reports that it believes the credit power should not be used for private advantage. Worse complaints, he must be aware, have been issued against Conservatives and Liberals; and he must also be aware that some of his followers are not guiltless of conduct which, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, makes of politics a game, and a game that is played without rules.

The Socialist, like other men, is known by the company he keeps. If he is looked upon as a Communist, the fault is his own. He has identified himself in Canada with a man bearing a grotesque foreign name, and therefore to our ears of sinister sound, who is now in gaol at a cost to the country of twenty-five hundred dollars. The public having more pressing problems to solve is disposed to side with the law, rather than with the Communist who is in gaol and the Socialist who is trying to get him out; and the violence of the one is looked upon as the inevitable consequence of the abstract aspiration of the other. To be in gaol is a powerful argument when the public mind is captured; but not all prisoners are martyrs. Persuasion and reason will capture the public mind; to scold and hector leaves it deaf and obstinate. The obscurity of definition has not escaped the notice of the Coadjutor-Archbishop of Montreal, who has made pointed reference to it, although Mr. J. S. Woodsworth has used strong means to define the distinction between Socialist and Communist.

It is in the asylum a man ought to be, who recommends confiscation by direct violence, when the process is going on so fast under the sanction of law. A string of railways has already been taken over; another has partly entered the fold; the banks are being hobbled; commissions and bureaus are being set up; farmers are told how

little, not how much, they can grow; the feebler industries are clamouring to be communized. In Montreal, men are pulling down their houses as the only means of getting them off their hands, and a quarter of a million people are living at the public expense. Throughout Canada half a million men are released into idleness from industrial slavery, and are finding in labour camps what Communism means.

If the Canadian Socialist would succeed, he must employ terms that are familiar to us, terms that have arisen out of our own experience, not from European conditions. The word in every Socialist mouth to describe us common people is *proletarians*; they go so far as to define all who work as slaves. Slavery is not in itself a dishonourable condition. John Knox, bound with a chain, laboured at the oar of a French galley for eighteen months. The word, if we can believe the dictionary, comes not from *servare*, to serve, but from Slav, a name applied by the Romans to a large group of Aryan people in northern Europe from whom captives in war were freely obtained, and is now attached to us who work. The Russians may be Slavs; we are not.

Considering slavery in the derived sense of the term, the Socialist is unaware that in every country of which we have any knowledge, except the United States and Canada, large productive industry was always imposed upon the weak by the strong, and was wrought into the habits of the people by a stern discipline. Out of the slave class as it was organized by the Romans in the countries subject to the Empire, the modern proletariat has been historically evolved. In the United States the process was not entirely otherwise; the negro supplies the proof. In Canada alone slavery of any kind never had a foothold. The pioneers were not compelled to work; they

were left free to starve and perish of the cold if that were their choice. But even in these two happy countries there is an antipathy to regular and sustained labour which is deeply rooted in human nature; indolence is not uncommon; irresponsibility is a welcome relief. It is for this reason army life is so attractive.

Sloth, the last of the seven deadly sins, will always tempt men to self-indulgent ease or indigent idleness. Let us call things by their right names. The extremest Socialist or Communist cannot prevent the slavery of the man to the woman or the woman to the man, of the parent to the child or the child to the parent, of the farmer to his animals, the writer to the editor, or the householder to his dog.

The Socialist affects to find in the Gospel a warrant for his political thesis, and does not hesitate to invoke the holy name. A closer reading would convince him that Jesus cared for none of these things, that his kingdom was not of this world. Lest he should offend the Roman conqueror, he paid the required tribute at the expense of a miracle to procure the money; he made a clear distinction between the things that were Caesar's and the higher tribute owing to God. The only poverty that concerned him was poverty of spirit. The mourners, the meek, the merciful, the pure in heart—their reward was in store for them; but it was only to those who had a hunger and thirst after righteousness he gave the assurance that they would be filled. The Socialist should remind himself that it is easier to be a saint in a warm climate than it is in Canada, that life was less complicated in the first century than it is in the twentieth, and that the laborious man who cultivated the wheat-field from which the apostolic company helped themselves is worthy of some place in the divine economy.

One may be neither stupid nor dishonest who assumes that the Socialists believe in an ultimate community of goods, and expresses distrust in that system. In the sacred writings to which they appeal with so much confidence, even a stupid person can read that the experiment was tried under ideal conditions, and failed. The community was of one heart and one soul; they had all things in common; neither was there any among them that lacked; those who were possessors of land or houses sold them; distribution was made to every man according to his need. And yet, even in that perfervid moment the scheme did not work. The case of Ananias and his wife is well known. They sold a possession and kept back part of the price; they lied not unto men alone; they fell down dead and were buried side by side. It is no wonder that after this sharp warning fear came upon as many as heard it. If such an event had happened in these times, the crown coroner would be compelled to conduct an inquiry; but it is doubtful whether even in Russia so convenient and startling a miracle could occur. Besides, those early Communists thought the end of the world was at hand. We have no such comfort; we must make the best of it.

II

Let us now see if we can bring our own experience within the compass of these general principles. Detached, Canadian history is a dull affair, little more than a parochial record. We have had Conservatives and Liberals, the one party steadfast in their inertia, the other striving for change, and both employing every method from open violence to secret craft. Indeed, the Liberals have always complained that they were the victims of political cunning in their opponents who appeared to them to have

selected the Marquis of Halifax as their model of a managing Conservative, putting off until to-morrow what was inconvenient for the day, half believing, half doing. In defence of himself, however, Halifax protested that God was the master trimmer, holding the balance between justice and mercy. In Canadian politics a similar office was performed by Sir John Macdonald, although his extreme opponents on both sides ascribed to him the qualities of a Manichaean demiurge.

Macdonald first came to notice in 1838 when he defended a Polish liberal, one of the survivors of the "battle of the windmill." The defence availed nothing; the man was hanged. In 1844, he entered the legislature as a Conservative. In 1854 he found a congeries of Tory, Rouge, Clear-Grit, Reformer, Moderate Reformer, and Conservative. Out of this he proceeded to form a new party to which he applied the name of Liberal-Conservative, and in 1856 he became the real head. He then devised the strategy to "dish the Whigs" by stealing their problems and then solving them. It did not occur to his opponents to dish him by calling themselves Conservative-Liberals. Within the next eight years there were ten different ministries, although they did not differ much the one from the other. By 1864 the union of Upper and Lower Canada was about to fall apart. Confederation of all the provinces was the only remedy. By an act of self-abnegation unparalleled in Canadian politics, George Brown agreed to enter a coalition with Macdonald who, with a show of reason on both sides, had become a personal enemy.

By some obscure process, the Conservatives have managed to identify themselves with the Fathers of Confederation; and to affiliate it in its legal sense, which is, to fix the paternity of an illegitimate child. The puta-

tive fathers are the Conservative Macdonald and the Liberal Brown, but to Brown must be ascribed priority in time and in right. The first account of the conception is given by Edward Whelan, who was present at the whole performance in 1864, and made a book in the following year.

The various conferences were held in secret, and the record of each participant is not complete. The Quebec Conference lasted "sixteen mortal days." The secretary, Hewitt Bernard, made careful notes, which were long afterwards found amongst Macdonald's papers. The final resolutions to the number of seventy-one were "non-officially promulgated" on November 12, in advance of their submission to the legislatures. According to the custom of the time, the growth of the idea was stimulated in a series of elegant and sumptuous public banquets.

At these deliberations, which were continuous from Charlottetown to Toronto, if we can judge from the cheers and laughter which Mr. Whelan describes, a condition of ecstasy must have prevailed; but it was Brown who spoke at greatest length and with the most sobriety. In Halifax he spoke eleven large pages, and in Toronto twenty-one. Macdonald said five pages in Halifax; in Montreal, Quebec, and Toronto none. In Ottawa, "on account of illness induced by fatigue from assiduous devotion to public duties, he was compelled to restrict his observations to a brief expression of thanks, but he was applauded as if he had made the most brilliant oration ever delivered; the importance of the matter was so vast that he faltered in the task and quailed before the responsibility of addressing the public upon it." In Charlottetown he is said to have spoken "for half a day, in that pleasing, chaste, and classical style for which he is distinguished," but the speech occupies only half a page in

Whelan's book. Of all the speeches Brown's is the only one that has any reality.

The government at the time was a coalition, and Cartier, one of the principal delegates, was so true a Liberal that he had carried a musket in the Rebellion of 1837. When the coalition fell apart, the credit for the confederation was lost to the Liberals. Macdonald had the habit, as he said, of stealing the Liberals' clothes whilst they were bathing. Arrayed therein, he and his party were neither Liberal nor Conservative, and his opponents were left naked. From the first he "never hesitated to express his opinion that a legislative union was preferable to confederation;" but at the Quebec Conference he was quick to discern "that such a system was impracticable," and he adopted the idea of confederation as his own.

In 1867 he had risen from attorney-general to prime minister in the Dominion parliament which was to put confederation in force. In 1873 he was driven from power by a railway scandal, as it was considered in those days, which in the light of subsequent events seems to us a very trivial affair. The amount of the contribution to the party funds was only the little one of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The telegram that fetched the remainder would now be considered merely in the routine of an election: "Immediate private I must have another ten thousand will be the last time of asking do not fail me answer to-day."

The Liberals remained in power only four years, but they accomplished much of their traditional policy; voting by ballot, elections on a single day, no property-test for members, disposal of public lands, supreme and exchequer courts, audit and temperance acts. But these were years of depression and panic; and the public mind was ripe for any change, even for a policy of protection,

to which the seductive name of national policy was applied. This policy was the precursor of Socialism.

There was doubt for the moment which party would adopt it; but the Conservatives seized it as their own, and returned to power, where by various devices, such as hiving the Grits, they remained for eighteen years. They were years of economic and religious strife from which Sir Wilfrid Laurier emerged as leader in 1896. The Conservative Quebec became Liberal—in name only—and has so remained until this day.

The Conservatives have always arrogated to themselves the prerogative of loyalty, although at times they have been in strange company. Patriotism has always been their first refuge. On a memorable occasion in parliament, "God save the King," sung in unison, was their final argument. Reciprocity with the United States came to be veiled treason, the first step towards annexation. Without the national policy of protection, Nova Scotia would fly off and reunite with the moon. The cry was follow the old man, the old policy, the old flag; and after the old leader had declared: "A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die"—there was nothing more to be said.

In 1911, when reciprocity was the main issue, the old cries were used with deadly effect. It was now treason, annexation, bartering our birthright for gold: and forgotten animosities were revived between Catholic and Protestant, between English and French, between East and West. Against this calculated emotion the Liberals were powerless, although between 1866 and 1898, seven offers had been made by both parties; and in 1910 a delegation of a thousand members from six federations of farmers came out of the West renewing the demand, and

making fresh demands for many elements of state socialism.

In the year 1849 the Conservatives so far forgot their loyalty as to sign a petition for annexation to the United States. There were a thousand signatories, of whom one was afterwards the leader of the party, and only thirty were French. In that year a bill was introduced in the legislature of Upper and Lower Canada, which met in Montreal, providing for a commission to assess "all just losses" incurred during the Rebellion of 1837. It met violent opposition, but was finally passed even by a majority of English-speaking members from Upper Canada. Lord Elgin, the Governor-General, was petitioned to withhold his consent, to dissolve parliament, or refer the bill to the imperial authorities. He refused on the ground that responsible government demanded his assent. The principle was now fully sanctioned.

The Conservative mob stoned Lord Elgin and the members; in a three-days' riot they wrecked ministers' houses, and burned the parliament-building to the ground. That patriot, Fred Perry, boasted to the present writer that it was he who with his club smashed the chandeliers and started the fire. This is a fresh contribution to Canadian history. The British government refused to intervene, but they were opposed by the Liberal Gladstone. Although Mackenzie and Papineau had failed in the armed attempt of 1837, the Liberals achieved responsible government for Canada in 1849, for Nova Scotia in 1848, for New Brunswick in 1855, for Prince Edward Island in 1863. The work of the Liberals as a party was complete, and in no long time as a party they disappeared. Having destroyed the principles of the Conservatives they forgot their own; and ever since both parties have continued to persist in name alone,

adopting the practices, the one of the other, according as they were in or out of power.

The two parties coalesced, as the two great separate rivers mingle when they arrive at Montreal. Montreal has a peculiarly solvent effect. The Conservatives forgot to be conservative. The Liberals departed far from their ancient policy, which is even yet occasionally proclaimed on the hustings and sounds so well, that their function is to give to all their individual liberty to use their God-given initiative, with just enough government interference to prevent them gaining control of the nation's wealth by their cunning. There is nothing new in all this. It is the content of innumerable histories, monographs, and lives; it is to be found in a fair and judicious summary by the industrious Professor Wittke.

The whole fabric of confederation was based upon an illusion, or rather upon a delusion of grandeur which is so highly praised even by sane men under the name of vision. The orations at the banquets in which the orators abandoned themselves to ecstasy, bewildering themselves and deceiving their audience, arouse sardonic and painful emotions as we read them in the light of present reality. From this reality there is no escape by way of fresh illusions. Even the desperate remedy of revolution is denied to us. There is no one to rebel against except ourselves. We alone are to blame for the condition that presses so hardly upon us; not any king, Downing Street, or family compacts. Nor is there any mother to whom we can run for relief. Newfoundland has been there ahead of us, and fatted calves are now scarce in England. We clamoured and rebelled for a division of the inheritance, for freedom, for responsible government; it is a fair but sorrowful retort that we should continue to be responsible for ourselves.

The provinces lived on bribes from the Dominion; they now discover that they were bribed at their own expense. The Western Provinces are crying for public relief; the Maritime Provinces are still demanding their rights; they point to the millions of northern acres from the public domain that were bestowed upon the Upper Provinces, to the canals, and railways. When it is suggested to them that they accept a transfer of those vast areas and railways to be administered and operated to their own profit or loss, they look upon the proposal with a wry face and a piteous smile. The antiquated ghosts of secession and annexation no longer walk as a political guide.

There is no hope from civil strife. Land may be had for nothing; there is no church property to be confiscated; the forests can be had for the asking; the fish in the sea, the coal in the ground, and all other natural resources are yet potential, whatever the word may mean. And even if all the securities on the stock-exchanges were seized, the new owners would be no better off than the old. Seized houses they could neither resell nor keep warm; the food in the shops would not last for a week, and the money in the banks does not belong to the bankers. They would not suffer the loss.

III

We have dealt with the imported terms *proletarian* and *wage-slave*. Another word imported from Europe is *capitalism*, the enemy to be destroyed. It is already destroyed. Besides being divided by nature and habit into Conservatives, Liberals, and Socialists, some men are savers, some are spenders. The habit of saving must be learned until it is engrained into the very nature. The

modern generation was brought up to spend with a recklessness that would have appalled the generation that went before. Economy to them is meanness, a denial of their birthright, a lowering of the standard of living they have established for themselves. They find something comical in the parsimony of their parents. Those old savers became the capitalists. A man would work for sixty years, and end as a rich man, with a well-equipped farm worth seven thousand dollars. By continuous thrift he saved thirty cents a day, and died a rich man instead of a recipient of private or public charity.

But the saver has fallen on evil times; his home bears a mortgage for public debt of all kinds amounting to twenty-five hundred dollars, and his gold dollar is worth only sixty cents. Income tax and succession duties have destroyed that useful instinct for leaving something to one's family; for, as Lord Rosebery said, there are ways of acquiring money more dishonourable than by inheritance. It was these savers who provided the money to build and run the railways, to endow universities and hospitals, to create joint-stock companies for industrial purposes. They are now discouraged. Legislatures have turned against them; laws are enacted by which contracts are broken and mortgages made of none effect. Abandoned by the Conservatives, despoiled by the Liberals, threatened by confiscators whom they cannot distinguish from Socialists, they have begun to hoard the poor remnant of their savings. That accounts for the present scarcity of money and the lack of credit which is based upon confidence. Credit is merely an opinion or a belief that a man is able, or at least willing, to pay what he owes.

There are also men with a genius for organization. It is they who at their own risk have provided us with

the amenities of life, which have become a necessity, with water and water-power, with electricity, street-cars, and railways. Many of them went down in the attempt, and are lost to sight; the few who succeeded are rewarded with envy and calumny. If they have grown rich, half of their income is filched away, and at their death a large part of their savings passes to the state to be wasted in public adventures, by which private enterprise is further destroyed. The advocates of state-ownership declare that men of equal genius may be found to exercise their talent, fettered like civil servants. Such are of the nature of artists. We might as well engage a civil servant to paint our pictures and write our poetry to order. The secret hope of the Socialist is that he will introduce a love of humanity and a spiritual enthusiasm into the public service, but he is doing very little to convince us that the consequent bureaucracy can be so inspired.

What more, it may be asked, does the Liberal, the Socialist, the Communist, or Labour want? Mr. Beatty himself cannot discharge from the railway service a defaulting conductor without the consent of his labour union. The orchestra in Montreal can be disbanded by a telegram from some obscure American city. In Quebec, the theatre, the concert-hall, the lecture-room, and other places devoted to culture and innocent entertainment are crippled by a charity tax of ten per cent. upon their gross receipts; and after that the labour unions must be satisfied. In Montreal, proprietors are largely outnumbered by tenants, and in some wards the majority of voters are on public relief.

He who five years ago had a golden dollar now finds himself with a piece of paper worth sixty cents. In the United States, and we propose to follow the example, a man who neglects to cast his last gold dollar into the

public treasury will find himself in gaol for ten years with all the Tim Bucks for company. All that is now required to complete this mediaeval savagery is a torture-chamber equipped with instruments of which drawings and working models may still be obtained from the complete collection in Nuremberg.

In the industrial process a few men inevitably became rich; some became rich through the speculative means which the system created. Many became poor and bitter because they failed in similar attempts. But the real complaint against organized industry is that it built up towns and cities at the expense of the country, making life so easy and agreeable, persuading citizens by public expenditure and organized charity that even if they do not work they need not perish. That delusion is at an end. Humpty-dumpty is fallen; he cannot be set up again. The problem facing Conservatives, Liberals, and Socialists alike, is to restore the balance between town and country, upon which the existence of every nation depends. The half-million idle must learn to do without the things their fathers never had, to do for themselves in the country what is too expensively done for them in the cities. That will be a hard lesson. Back to the land sounds well; but these denizens of the city to whom the public school is the whole of life will be terrified by the dark, the cold, and the sound of the wind in the trees. They will be helpless as domestic animals turned adrift.

The Conservatives have always contended that they were in reality socialists; but if they were going to fire a gun they would draw the trigger slowly. Lord Hugh Cecil has carefully analysed the human mind—the distrust of the untried, the dread of the unknown, the adherence to old custom in social life, in dress, machines, thought, religion, and political institutions. Men will

live, work, and die for old ideas and old words, even for a new series of letters, but they must appear to signify a word, like N-a-z-i-s in our own time. A series of letters that looks like the designation of a radio station will not sink deep into the ears or penetrate the mind. C-C-F, the new slogan, suffers from that disability. If the principles the term represents were expressed in some verbal form, they would be a valuable contribution towards political action.

The present is not the moment for political prophecy unless as a record of the things we think will happen and will not. One can predicate from the past what Conservatives, Liberals, Socialists, or Communists will do. No one can foresee in what direction the mass of voters will stampede. Small sections of voters could be persuaded, cajoled, bribed, or forced. With a franchise made universal by the inclusion of women, what the mass will do becomes a problem in infinity, the despair of the politician. They will not be governed; they will not govern themselves; they will not follow a leader to the end. On the contrary, at the first alarm, they will cast him down with the ignominy of a fallen idol.

We have not far to seek. Representative government in every country so laboriously built up since the French Revolution was, as Bismarck said, merely an experiment, and is now under a dark eclipse. From the United States that institution which they supposed divine and eternal has vanished. Whether by force of economic law their new experiment will fail or by some miracle succeed, the effect upon us will be equally profound. The dull social, economic, and political life of this continent has blazed up like a fire suddenly forced by hot air. The confederation is under a heavy strain. Between the provinces and the Dominion rifts old and new are being

disclosed. Lesser unions and federations are being talked of; there is even an echo of the old cry, secession.

The Socialist is the only one who yet has a principle, but he does his best to conceal it, even if he knows what it is. The more vigorous exponents are earnest young men who irritate more than they convince. They spend their time hammering nails into fallen idols, railing at Conservative and Liberal alike. They will take no part in easing the heavy burden of the politician either by silence or by sympathy; they are content to hold back, to oppose, as Mr. Squire said in another connection, to be political mules condemned to sterility and ill-temper. The Conservatives launched the Dominion into the shallows of socialism. The Liberals will not hand, reef, or steer. Unless both parties return to their original discipline, the Socialists will be free to persuade and convince us that they are competent to assume command.

Ten years ago, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald described the real Socialist as the true evolutionist, who seeks to transform society by the processes proper to an organized living being; he does not stop life to try experiments or institute a new system. He is less concerned with immediate results than with the purpose which governs his actions; he is ruled by ideals; he makes no violent breaks with the old; he rejects revolution, convinced that when the convulsion spreads itself, he must begin all over again. Strikes, sabotage, limitation of output, violence, and doles are contrary to his ideal of unstinted service in return for a reasonable reward; these are contrary to his spirit, immoral, uneconomic, and sure to lead to disaster. This is what we require to be told.

By the bowels of Christ, Cromwell adjured the Scots clergy, consider that you may be mistaken. Similarly the Socialist is now besought to ask himself if

he is quite sure that his Socialism will stop at the ideal mark within the spiritual bounds he has set. In that searching of his heart he might well employ as his catechism the text of José Ortega y Gasset, the brilliant intellectual who uses history as the basis of prophecy. He is a father of the new Spanish republic, and the warning he gives to his own offspring of the perils in their path equally applies to us. When we have attained to that present height which to the Russians by contrast with their old misery is the summit of good, we may look back with yearning to the past as our golden age.

Civilization is an artificial and fragile thing, built up by the slow labour of individuals, groups, and minorities, by the personal efforts of a few gifted men endowed with a desire for perfection, expressed by art, for wisdom, and for general amenity of life. They were compelled to defend this precious thing by force and then by law against barbarian invasion from without. At times they failed, and civilization perished. The barbarian had no interest in it; his god was his belly; he cared only for the comfort it yielded; he had entered into an inheritance as if it were a spontaneous gift from the gods like the sun and air; he was free to do what he pleased, living on the past, abandoned to his own devices, enjoying rights and feeling no obligations, satisfied with himself, secure in his triumph, concerned only with his selfish well-being, free to live without culture, without standards of thought or conduct. He was like a spoiled child with no one to teach him that he could not live as he liked.

Sunk in sloth, without external compulsion to think or act, their faculties atrophied and their conceit led them to disaster. They became the victims of a small minority of fellow-barbarians who had retained their virtue. The inevitable result was a king or dictator who supplied them

with a discipline; and civilization began once more the slow upward climb. That is the ancient history of Europe. Modern history opened when the eternal Conservatives began to yield with a grudging generosity, followed by the Liberals, who gave what did not belong to them. This is a new era, when the Socialist begins with open hands to give all to those who may be incapable of using the gift except to their own hurt.

Sr. Ortega's fear, expressed to his own people, from which our Socialists might well take warning, is that Socialism may become statism, the people fuel for the machine; that a new barbarism may arise from within as the old came from without. This attempt at a transition to a new and different world may be a catastrophe to humanity. By a single mistake our civilization, such as it is, may disappear, and man may find himself once more a primitive being, a mere unit in an unorganized multitude, part of a mass, all of the same mental texture, making no effort toward intellectual, artistic, or any other kind of perfection, with life nothing more than a satisfaction of animal needs. The good gift will then have turned to evil, by a rebellion against destiny. Before these words are in print, their full meaning may be disclosed by a great light in the political sky.

D. H. LAWRENCE AND KATHERINE MANSFIELD AS LETTER-WRITERS

The Lamont Lecture at Yale University*

Louis Cazamian

THE letters of D. H. Lawrence and those of Katherine Mansfield are the records of two outstanding personalities; two writers of yesterday, whose voices seem to ring still in our ears. A common virtue of uncompromising sincerity, a nakedness of soul, endears them to us, at a time of stress, when disillusioned man is trying to look unflinchingly at his own self.

Katherine Mansfield has been dead eleven years; Lawrence only four. But he was born earlier (in 1885; Katherine Mansfield in 1889), and his published correspondence stretches over a longer period (1909 to 1930; that of Katherine Mansfield, 1913 to 1922). His tormented genius, no doubt, seems to bear more distinctly the very shape, and to show the pressure of our age. Is his spirit, however, nearer to us than Katherine Mansfield's? Not so, if Katherine Mansfield's be more certainly of all time. Her letters embody as well as his that essential honesty which gives its lasting worth to the searchings of conscience; and the charm of her manner, in its exquisiteness, holds our minds even more strongly than the powerful fascination of Lawrence. His letters will not live longer; hers will seem fresher when the restlessness of our time has worked itself out and

*The lecture was delivered at Yale, on March 5, 1934. Quotations are from *The Letters of Katherine Mansfield*, edited by J. Middleton Murry, 2 vols., 1928, and *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, edited with an introduction by Aldous Huxley, 1932.

violence is no more the hall-mark of spiritual truth. We shall respect the fitness, as well as the chronology, of the subject, if we take up Lawrence first; did he not write—and to whom but to Katherine Mansfield?—"I do think a woman must yield some sort of precedence to a man, and he must take this precedence." But while his "savage pilgrimage" is of absorbing interest, we may well feel even more poignantly the appeal of another quest, that of the valiant soul which through pain, with a finer sense of moral issues, sought to be "crystal-clear."

The object of our study is thus the relation, in analogy and contrast, of two sincerities.

I

From the first, Lawrence's manner in his letters is straightforward, a trifle blunt, or cynical. With time, and the swift development of the fate whose seeds were mainly in his own character, the tone somewhat changes; there appears, in the proved writer, in the prophet whose genius is accepted by the many who deny, as by the few who acclaim it, a firmer assurance, a bearing of authority; he expresses himself more fully; his statements are charged with a deliberate energy; he relies on cumulative emphasis, stressing the same points again and again with characteristic dogged insistence. The note of anger, the bitter denunciation of social lies, of the War, of Europe, of a doomed civilization, are frequently heard. Every now and then the mood relaxes, and a scene from life, or from nature, is described in graphic touches, slow, vigorous, thick. Often enough the letter will be just familiar and matter-of-fact, thrash out a practical question with ease, simplicity, a touch of irony. Or, chiefly in his last years, Lawrence will send to his friends

the mere jottings of a tired man, haunted by the fever of his unquiet spirit, by the sense of his ebbing vitality. But always his writing is direct and free, immune from the slightest affectation, from the most venial turn of rhetoric or cleverness. No straining after effect, no fine phrasing, no eloquence except the sheer impressiveness of profoundly earnest speech.

At the root of that manner is a constant motive, a soul of intent, that silently oozes out and soaks into us as we read. Conspicuous all through that volume is the maxim, shown in the effect over each page: there is no special style of epistolary prose. A letter is part of life, and that, at least, should be immune from the poison of meretricious art: "The literary element, like a disagreeable substratum under a fair country, spreads under every inch of life, sticking to the roots of the growing things. Ugh, that is hateful!" Even the profound writer, the novelist for instance, is to be supremely independent, strike out for himself, worship no shibboleth: "Tell Arnold Bennett that all rules of construction hold good only for novels which are copies of other novels." Poetry itself must have no law more binding than that of a directness which shall at one blow smash through the conventions of phrasing: "Break the rhyme rather than the stony directness of speech. . . . The essence of poetry with us in this age of stark and unlovely actualities is a stark directness, without a shadow of a lie. . . ." No wonder, then, that in the relationships of actual living, the paramount duty should be absolute frankness to oneself and others. Like all genuine apostles Lawrence, in the ardour of his faith, cannot bear with the dried stereotyped beliefs upon which the whole human order rests. Everything is deceit and treachery in the social world. A blunt uncompromising

candour, brutal upon occasion, will be the most appropriate garb to the desperation of a universal rebel. The mood of Rousseau is upon Lawrence, but the tone of his voice is much nearer that of Nietzsche: "The only comfort, in the long run, is the truth, however bitter it be."

No well-meant softening of facts, then, no pretence, no disguise. Modesty is but cant. If the artist thinks his work good, let him say so. Of his articles in the short-lived *Signature* (1915), Lawrence writes: "I think my papers are very beautiful and very good." And yet, he had confessed to an instinct of self-devaluation, almost to an inferiority-complex: "I am always ready to believe the worst that is said about my work, and reluctant of the best." More paradoxically, that contemner of opinion will not bear the thought of standing revealed, in his intimate being, to the eyes of men: "I loathe the book, because it will betray me to a parcel of fools. Which is what any deeply personal or lyrical writer feels, I guess." But Lawrence had the most fundamental and serious reasons to ignore the claims of superficial consistency. Even before his indictment of the intellect has been conveyed in the novels, we find it clearly adumbrated in the letters. The best in us must well up from the dark regions of the subconscious. Our ideas, our acts, our whole personalities, should "have roots," be related to the deeper powers that lie in us, unknown of ourselves. A passive behaviour is the wisest, in that sense: "Let go all this will to have things in your own control;" and no artificial coherence should be forced from the outside upon our impulses, provided they be genuine.

Following this trend, we should pass on to the general philosophy of Lawrence, the growth of which his letters

allow us to watch, so full are they of the spontaneous, the unceasing rumination of his thought. But a study of his doctrine would demand a broader basis. That is a world in itself, and too wide for these remarks to do more than touch its fringe. Let it be said, at least, that owing to the light it throws upon the development of an active, anxious, tensely sincere mind, that collection of letters bears the seal of greatness perhaps more than any other of Lawrence's works.

It is our less ambitious aim to dwell at some length upon the wealth of those outpourings, as the diary of an extraordinarily full, mobile, and pathetic life. The tone of longing is audible everywhere; perpetual dissatisfaction throws a gloom upon the present reality, and invests with a glamour the distant dream—the far Eden, the sunny island, the camp under the pines in Florida, the ranch in New Mexico; places to which Lawrence went in the flesh, or only in imagination; and where the sorry business of living was to be recast according to the heart's desire. There the obsession of self would be exorcised; and the new Pantisocrats, the chosen few, would be reborn in the resurrection of their buried souls. How potent the spell can be! Lawrence is the arch-individualist, his nerves are sore and quivering, he has no patience with things or people; and for that very reason a deep compensatory instinct drives him to wild desires of losing himself, of finding delicious release in communion: "I want . . . relations based upon some unanimous accord in truth or belief, and a harmony of purpose. . . . I am weary of personality." Who will join the party of pilgrims? Shadowy figures flicker on the page: "I have found a nice man called Heseltine who will come to Florida—a musician, 21, very nice—also an Indian—very nice. We will have

a happy time yet, we will blossom like the rose. At the present it is the heaviest of winters." Will Katherine Mansfield come, and John Middleton Murry? No, they will not, somehow. With Katherine he has no fault to find: "But you I am sure of—I was ever since Cornwall, save for Jack;" with Murry the case is different; the note of suspicion, of irony, is heard from the beginning, strangely mixed with that of trust; and it all leads up to the sad blunt final letter: "We don't know one another —if you knew *how* little we know one another! . . . Believe me, we belong to different worlds, different ways of consciousness, you and I."

And so, through fifteen years of restless shifting from place to place, each continent, each land, each climate, in turn comes in for its share of glowing hope, of enthusiasm, disappointment, execration. And the miserably breathless pursuit of a peace that Lawrence cannot find, because he has in him the very spirit of trouble, ends with Vence, and the half-articulate poignant jotting, in conclusion to the ultimate message: "This place no good." That place, though, he was never to leave.

The research, eager but sterile, had a human aspect: somewhere, true friendship was to unite reborn men and women; one small group must be the cell of a new world. In spite of his wanderings, Lawrence established numberless contacts; the names of people known to us, or who exist through him, swarm in those pages. No plainer proof of his craving for affection, of the ever-springing illusion in his breast; but how few of those bonds did survive to the end! Admirers lasted longer than personal friends; or those were the best friends who were also admirers. Historians of early twentieth-century literature, not only in England or in Europe, but the world over, will find those letters a useful mine. The most

precious value of those relationships, however, is that their cross-lights give us a fuller revelation of Lawrence himself. He appears to us with the ebb and flow of his feelings, so easily wounded, so rarely expanding in simple joy or acceptance, so often roused to hatred of an exasperating universe. Rays of pure light, two or three times, fall aslant the dreary prospect, cut off a patch of bliss from out the dark troubled waters: "Life can be great—quite god-like. It can be so. God be thanked I have proved it." That was written in the honeymoon of the union with Frieda. Only a few weeks later, a storm was raging: "I didn't know life was so hard," and a relationship from which, in spite of all, Lawrence probably drew his most needed moral support, had entered upon its uneven tempestuous course. Could such a temper find repose in affection, and in affection for a woman? Was not love to Lawrence a battle for supremacy, in which each partner must at all costs keep his individuality unshackled? Is not the doctrine of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* a curious mysticism of the body, which has no place for the permanence that only feeling can build on another plane? And did not the male in Lawrence distrust, almost despise, the feminine half of our kind? The letters mince no words as to woman—even if a Lady Ottoline Morrell, a Catherine Carswell, go some way to redeem their sex.

So the mood of Lawrence settles gradually into a tenor of misanthropy. "I hate the 'public,' and 'people,' 'society,' so much, that a madness possesses me when I think of them. I hate democracy so much. It almost kills me. But then, I think that 'aristocracy' is just as pernicious, only it is much more dead. They are both evil. But there is nothing else, because everybody is either 'the people' or 'the capitalist'." Gone are the

dreams of unity, of the life in communion: "Don't talk to me of unison. No more unison among man than among the wild animals—coyotes and chipmunks and porcupines and deer and rattlesnakes. They all live in these hills—in the unison of avoiding one another." Long before that he had written: "To live, one must hurt people so. One has to make up one's mind, it must be so." Thus the tide of pessimism keeps coming, ever stronger, and in the trough of the waves the poor soul drifts helplessly. Only the unquenched desire of the otherwhere persists. Within a few days of his death, he was still writing from the South of France: "I wish I could sail away to somewhere really thrilling—perhaps we shall go to the ranch."

The main thrill, indeed, was to arise from the physical environment, the non-human part of experience; and Lawrence remained ever alive to the attraction of sky and earth, of setting and scenery. He rarely, in these letters, strikes the note of full-dress description; his sense of hostility to all approved modes of expression was too strong for that. But landscape and weather played a prominent part in his life—with his health and his nerves, could it be otherwise?—and to his correspondent of the day, he must tell how he fares in his surroundings. Sketches, more or less developed, will thus crop up at no long intervals. Early in his career, he had made a profession of depicting things carelessly, as they came: "I admit your accusation of impressionism. . . . Suddenly, in a world full of tones and tints and shadows, I see a colour and it vibrates on my retina. I dip a brush in it and say: 'See, that's the colour?' So it is, so it isn't." To the end he kept that directness of manner, that exclusive attention to the immediate object. But the word "impressionism" suggests a light touch, and "light"

is not the epithet one should ever apply to Lawrence. He pushes the truth of impression and imagination as far as he can, and renders it with strongly evocative words, selected by a sure instinct, which is undoubtedly a gift of genius. There is thus a deliberate energy in every dab of the brush, but the touch in its vigour is reckless, and no care is taken to work in half-tones, to relieve undue uniformity, to key down exaggerated effects. A strong unity is realized; a dominant atmosphere is produced by repetition, by stressing the same accent again and again. The art is altogether powerful and effective; with its constant reiteration, its monotonous, fascinated absorption in significant details, it awakes in us a haunting sense of obsession. Vivid and unforgettable as the scenes are, they leave one under an uneasy consciousness of doubt; the landscape has been violated rather than conquered; a soul has been forced upon it from the outside; the fair balance of its elements, its own shy individuality, its unique character, have been unscrupulously dealt with. Lawrence depicts nature in a forcibly romantic and symbolist style, and his truth of effect is subject to all the risks of a susceptible, an irritable, a fanciful sensibility. But when all is said, those pictures of places and lands bear the irresistible stamp of creative transfiguration; and who shall limit the right of the artist to read his own vision on the face of the world? Of that peculiar style, this sketch of the fight between sea and coast in Cornwall is perhaps as good a specimen as any:

> I love to see those terrifying rocks, like solid lumps of the original darkness, quite impregnable; and then the ponderous, cold light of the sea foaming up: it is marvellous. It is not sunlight. Sunlight is really firelight. This cold light of the heavy sea is really the eternal light washing against the eternal

> darkness, a terrific abstraction, far beyond all life, which is merely of the sun, warm.

A cosmic and Blakean interpretation of a titanic struggle.

A love of earth is implied in such a fascination. But the blasphemy, with Lawrence, is never far from the ecstasy. His aggressive, suffering, unstable sincerity will hide none of the petulant changes of his mood. Of mountains he felt the appeal, and spoke impressively; and with equal gusto this is what he can write: "As for mountains—if I stick my little finger over my head, I can see it shining against the sky and call it Monte Rosa. No, I can't do with mountains at close quarters—they are always in the way, and they are so stupid, never moving and never doing anything but obtrude themselves." This, at least, is humour, and a light mood—two elements not so infrequent in the letters as one might suppose. Among the most powerful notes that Lawrence has struck, here as in the novels, is the attraction of the primitive and the wild. No one has felt more vividly the weird beauty of the American deserts, from California to Mexico. But through the romance and the glow, and the strange call to jaded minds of the virgin soil, whose spiritual treasure has remained fresh and unspoilt by man, there will surge up, stronger than all, the terrifying sense of desolation and death:

> There is a blazing sun, a vast hot sky, big lonely inhuman green hills and mountains, a flat blazing littoral with a few palms, sometimes a dark blue sea which is not quite of this earth—then little towns that seem to be slipping down an abyss—and the door of life shut on it all, only the sun burning, the clouds of birds passing, the zopilotes like flies, the lost lonely palm-trees, the deep dust of the roads, the donkeys moving in a gold dust-cloud. . . . There seems a sentence of extinction written over it all.

And the last word once more is disillusionment: "The 'world' has no life to offer. Seeing things does not amount to much."

Incoherent, but desperately reaching down to a coherence of the deeper being, which he thought he grasped, which again and again eluded his clutch, and of which he could give us only the intuitive momentary sense, such does Lawrence appear to us in his letters, as in all his work. So innumerable and piercing are his thrusts at the inner life, at the truer reality of character, art, nature, and the whole world of man, that the book holds our remembrance through its fragmentary but rich suggestiveness, its incomplete but vital beauty. If it does not satisfy us, if it provokes us to fatigue or irritation, if it leaves us bewildered and sad, with the feeling of having witnessed the tragedy of a forlorn self-devouring soul, yet it has given a sharper edge to our instinct of moral truthfulness, and added to our knowledge of the complexity of our being. As we close the book, we do not find ourselves enlightened and guided by a persuasive, a clear, and a self-commanding spirit; in the very strength that has been brought to bear upon us, there has been a suggestion of passiveness, of blind automatic thinking, of an elemental urge; or shall we say, a touch of something sinister, of hysteria? But in spite of all, we still feel, beating upon us, the repeated impact of that earnest, never-weary utterance; of that slow, powerful, fumbling, obstinate manner, like a strong tide that keeps advancing, with wave after wave breaking and retiring, but the whole mass irresistibly gaining forward, pushed at the back by the cosmic force of an ocean. One more quotation will perhaps make clearer that most characteristic feature of Lawrence's self-expression. This was written about November, 1915:

> When I drive across this country, with autumn falling and rustling to pieces, I am so sad, for my country, for this great wave of civilization, 2000 years, which is now collapsing, that it is hard to live. So much beauty and pathos of old things passing away and no new things coming: this house—it is England—my God, it breaks my soul—their England, these shafted windows, the elm-tree, the blue distance—the past, the great past, crumbling down, breaking down, not under the force of the coming birds, but under the weight of many exhausted lovely yellow leaves, that drift over the lawn and over the pond, like the soldiers, passing away, into winter and the darkness of winter—no, I can't bear it. For the winter stretches ahead, where all vision is lost and all memory dies out.

Here, under the stress of his prevailing mood, which no controlling intellect filters, clarifies, and organizes, Lawrence draws very close to the formless style of the "stream-of-consciousness" school.

II

"Poor Katherine," wrote Lawrence to Murry, some time after her death, "she is delicate and touching—but not *great*! Why say great?"

This is not a just verdict; and with all his fitful penetration into hidden values, Lawrence did not much care to be just. He lacked what was most surely great in Katherine Mansfield: the poise and the balance of an unerring instinct, confirmed by a pure, a keen intellectual sincerity; the willing obedience of the artist to the individuality of things, and a supreme devotion to truth—that which is founded on the surrender and the criticism of self.

It is a strange fate that those two human beings, so different in most respects, should appear to us definitely linked, not only by their actual contacts, but by some analogies of destiny, and even of temper. Katherine

Mansfield's letters are not unlike those of Lawrence in their pathetic appeal. Her life, too, was cut short, after years of a fight against disease and depression which she could, at times, have hoped to win. She felt the agony of the War through every fibre of her heart, and in the strong indignation of her mind. She had to write under distressing circumstances. Her struggle for health, the sensitiveness of her undermined frame, the anxiety of her spirit, contributed to a restlessness that kept her uneasily shifting from place to place. But she was a woman; however emancipated, she accepted marriage as a bond; there were limits not to her courage, but to her desire for change; with her, love was a craving, and a sufficient source of happiness; had chance been less unfavourable, she could have found peace in tranquillity. Her doom was more cruel than that of Lawrence; she was responsible for very little of the loneliness, for few of the worries, that afflicted her with an almost constant burden. The disasters and bereavements of the War were brought home to her very directly. The tale of her daily thoughts and moods, as it is given us by the *Letters*, more fully than by the *Journal*, has a poignancy, and stirs in us a sympathy, beyond the emotional share which we take in the drama of Lawrence's career. Some of us will admire, in the man, even his touch of Nietzschean hardness, and his attempt to raise revolt to a higher plane, altogether, than that of sentiment; but the woman is no less valiant for not having abjured tenderness; and no one was ever freer from sentimentality than Katherine Mansfield.

That her kindness could be soured, no reader indeed will deny. Her mind was sharp like her senses; and pain added an edge to her susceptibilities. The vulgar, the ugly, the foolish, moved her to outbursts of pitiless

satire. When that harsh mood is upon her—and it grows much less frequent with time—her letters have passages of pungent irony. Often lonely, poor, ill, in years of stress, she had much to bear; and her spirit rose in scorn against the selfishness, the brutality of people. She had ample provocation; but her charity can be wanting. The French come in for a large share of her impatient criticism; but the British, the Italians, the Swiss, the Germans, are not spared either. Still, that is not, by far, the dominant note. The bulk of the letters bear witness to a responsive, a gentle disposition. She speaks glowingly of the good points of nations and individuals. She never lost the power, and the willingness, to enter into the emotions of others. Her insight into character is made up of that supple intuitiveness. She had more than her share of the companionship with simple beings, and with bird and flower and tree, which is not the privilege of woman, but which some feminine writers have made particularly their own. She was ready for the lessons of Dostoievsky and Tchekov even before she turned eagerly to them. Some episodes in her letters, like many in her stories, have the wistful thrilling humanity of Charles-Louis Philippe. She can speak charmingly of a French maid-of-all-work:

> I have really loved her—and her songs, her ways, her kneeling in front of the fire and *gronding* the *bois vert*—her rushes into the room with the big bouquets and her way of greeting me in the morning as though she loved the day, and also the fact that she distinguished your letters from others. "Ce n'est pas *la* lettre—malheur!" Goodbye Juliette, my charming double stock in flower. I'll never forget you. You were a real being. You had roots.

The stuff of her letters is that of her life; she cuts it out into fragments impulsively, with perfect ease, but

not without a sure, an innate sense of natural structure and form. The tale of daily incidents, the relation of things seen or heard, the sketches of people, are interwoven with the moving, merry, or more often sad, succession of her moods, in which the weather, the sky, the light, play a conspicuous part, and, more deeply, the ebb and flow of her vitality itself, ever threatened by a sudden cloud, a change of wind. Her intellectual interests, quiescent at times, subdued to a familiar or a light key, are ever active in the background. They do not show, as with Lawrence, in frequent theorizings and prophetic outpourings; but spontaneous as her manner is, the serious topics will crop up. A recluse, she kept in touch with more friends than one, read much and critically, felt aware of the new trends. Few and unpretending as the discussions of ideas are, they have vigour, clarity, deftness. Her quick intuition reached a deep layer of thought, and she could be profound without being obscure. That variety of tone and that unaffected zest for all subjects, even in the darker times of depression and pain, are an unfailing source of charm. Among the collections of English letters, those of Katherine Mansfield have won a very distinguished place by a liveliness of word and phrase, which others have equalled but none has surpassed. The exquisiteness of the touch is an ever-renewed pleasure and wonder. Such a felicity is a gift, of course; but it links up with a broader instinct, a delicately trained discrimination, and a fine sanity of judgment.

The letters thus possess many of the merits of the short stories, with a less sustained perfection and an animated facility which is to a lesser degree an effect of art. They offer us the same delightfully neat pictures and portraits. We watch Katherine Mansfield at work;

taking in the shapes, the colours, the expressions of persons, objects, places, storing outlines, images, and tones with a quick, a vivid perception of character. That power is ever ready, always effective; she will play with it at times for the sheer excitement and thrill of it; her eye lights on a passing figure, a woman at her door, a boy peeling a wand, a flash of sunshine through leaves, and the thing itself is caught on the page, and dwells there forever. So rich is the accumulated treasure, that the working of imagination and that of memory are indistinguishable. "Sometimes when I am awake here," she writes to a friend,

> Very early in the morning, I hear, far down on the road below, the market carts going by. And at the sound I live through this getting up before dawn, the blue light in the window—the cold solemn look of the people—the woman opening the door and going for sticks—the smell of smoke—the feather of smoke rising from their chimney. I hear the man as he slaps the little horse and leads it into the clattering yard. And the fowls are still asleep—big balls of feather. But the early morning air and hush. And after the man and wife have driven away, some little children scurry out of bed across the floor and find a piece of bread and get back into the warm bed and divide it. But this is *all the surface.* Hundreds of things happen down to minute, minute details. But it is all so full of beauty—and you know the voices of people before sunrise—how different they are? I lie here, thinking of these things and hearing those little carts. . . . It is too much. One must weep.

Such was her impassioned, her ever-resilient love of life. Those sketches, those glimpses of garden and wood, of mountain and sea, of the changeful sky, are touched with an admirable accuracy and suggestiveness; they are entirely definite, clear-cut, convincing, and at the same time imaginative and poetic.

She was a born writer, but she knew that art is long and difficult, and she took infinite pains with her creative work. The letters, while revealing to us the quality of her gift, show us as well the honesty and devotion of her labour. She tells us how she realized the complexity of her task by degrees, and gave herself to it with a fierce absorption, severely trying, but full of joy. Work was more than a duty, it was the breath of her life; the weeks of fever and exhaustion, when she had to rest, were a torture. Thus grew these little masterpieces, *Prelude*, *At the Bay*, *The Garden Party*, *The Voyage*, *The Daughters of the Late Colonel*, of a texture so fine and firm, in which the pregnant inevitable word, the graphic touch of the letters, are enhanced by a severe economy, an inflexible discretion, which bear the stamp of the most fastidious, scrupulous taste. And yet, there is no strain, and here again the letters are instructive: with such a fund of ready observation, how could she have lost the benefit of freshness, of an invention immediate and inspired? At the worst, she would be saved by her humour from the risk of a constrained tone, of an over-polished style. It is a pleasant surprise to find those letters, so often penned in physical and moral anguish, enlivened by a fund of inexpressible whimsicality that breaks out in delightful pranks of fancy and fun. No saturnine irony, as with Lawrence, but an *espièglerie* that reminds one of the French Colette:

> I saw old Ma'am Gamel yesterday. She is a nice old dear. The way she speaks of you makes me want to *hug* her. Yesterday she said I must pass by her before I go back as she would send you a little souvenir—and then she looked up at me and said, her blue eyes twinkling, "Il a toujours ses beaux yeux, le jeune mari?" "Allez! Allez! On n'a pas honte?" called Thérèse, who was measuring biscuits for L. M. I also saw . . . the old woman from the droguerie. She's got a new cat called

> Minne, "un grand, un sauvage, un fou avec des moustaches which would make a man pleurer d'envie." In fact, she says, he is "presqu'un homme—il *crache* absolument comme un homme—et le soir il est toujours dans les rues."

What bravery of spirit, at such a time, thus to relish the quaintness of simple folk! Even when things are too hard and self-pity comes in, self-mockery is not far.

Such a fine instinct, spontaneous and at the same time highly conscious, must be guided by a luminous perception of artistic values. On this point again, the letters edify us fully. The literary judgment of Katherine Mansfield is remarkably sure and sane. She shows proof of having rediscovered for herself, recreated in her own terms, the wisdom of the classics. A very modern writer, she rises in that above her time, links up with the most authentic tradition. How could we wonder at the unerringness of her artistic sense, when we see her critical mind at work, read her appreciations of writers, old or new? Her insight is quite as keen as that of Lawrence, and her views are more rounded, more fair; her appraisals are less negative and acknowledge merit more generously. She can be destructive, though, in finding the weak spot when she deals with a well-established reputation—as her paragraph on Bernard Shaw is sufficient proof:

> G.B.S. on Butler is very fine indeed. He has such a grip of his subject. I admire his tenacity as a reviewer and the way in which his mind follows Butler with a steady light—does not waver over him, find him, lose him, travel over him. At the same time it's queer he should be (G.B.S.) so uninspired. There is not the faintest hint of inspiration in that man. This chills me. You know the feeling that a great writer gives you: "My spirit has been fed and refreshed: it has partaken of something new." One could not possibly feel that about Shaw. It's the clang of the gate that remains with you when all's over. What

> it amounts to is that Shaw is anything you like, but he's not an artist. Don't you get when you read his plays a sense of extraordinary *flatness*? They may be extremely amusing at moments, but you are always laughing *at* and never *with*. Just the same in his prose: you may agree as much as you like, but he is writing *at*, not *with*. There's no getting over it: he's a kind of concierge in the house of literature—sits in a glass case, sees everything, knows everything, examines the letters, *cleans the stairs*, but has no part, no part in the life that is going on.

After that, we may ask ourselves, with some curiosity, whether she has anything to say of Lawrence. She has, on several occasions; this for instance: "I have read a long letter from Lawrence. . . . I am so fond of him for many things. I cannot shut my heart against him and I never shall." In its brevity, with the reservations implied and the affirmations expressed, that comes very near to being a final judgment. Indeed, she was no less gifted as a critic than as a creator. In her modest way she worked out a doctrine of perfection, on entirely sound principles, and to those principles, in everything that concerned her chosen craft, she was herself a willing slave.

The perfection she sought was not only that of line and form. Art already was a focus of the higher life: devotion, suppression of self, concentration upon the object; and in all these love was implied, as there was no art but was sustained, inspired by sympathy. But all around there stretched the wide field of conduct, through all of which the same ideal prevailed. Katherine Mansfield's letters make us a party to the elaboration of her faith—a process of gradual development profoundly moving in its sincerity. A stoic resignation was the core of her belief but a resignation warmed to an enthusiasm of willingness and love. At the very end, she

still could renew her first fresh rapture in life, express it in unforgettable words:

> Oh, how I love flowers! I think of them with such longing. I go through them, one after another, remembering them from the first moments with love—oh, with rapture, as if they were babies! . . . Oh, Earth! Lovely, unforgettable Earth. Yesterday, I saw the leaves falling, so gently, so softly, raining down from little slender trees, golden against the blue. Perhaps Autumn is loveliest. Lo! It is Autumn. What is the magic of that? It is magic to me.

A song to autumn which, in its difference from Lawrence's dirge, quoted above, would be no ill-chosen index to their widely diverging sensibilities. And so her love of Earth embraces the inevitable coming of darkness and decay; for she had learned that to love was to accept; because pain was an essential part of experience. "It seems to me that the *secret* of life is to *accept* life. Question it as much as you like after, but first accept it." To her, in the nearest and the most direct sense, that meant accepting death, and she knew it. We feel the immolation of self growing upon her, as a duty, an escape, a salvation. And so her art, her faith, her love, mingled in a semi-mystic mood, not unlike the inspiration of some Russian writers, but arising in her from the deepest instincts of her own sick, despairing spirit:

> Why can't I give you—send you like a present—this day like a pearl? There's no sun; the sky is folded, the sea moves and that is all. It is so still, the air is so gentle that every tiny flower seems to be a world unto itself. I am sitting at the window and below a silent, silver coloured cat is moving through a jungle of freezias. . . . Don't feel bitter! We must not. Do let us ignore the people who aren't real, and live deeply, the little time we have here. It really does seem that the world has reached a pitch of *degradation* that never could have been imagined—but we know it—we are not deceived. And the

> fact of knowing it and having suffered, each in our own way, *cannot* make life—the life of the universe—what we mean when we stand looking up at the stars—or lie watching the ladybird in the grass—or feel—talking to one we love—less marvellous. I think that we—our generation—ought to live in the consciousness of this huge, solemn, exciting, mysterious background. It's our religion, our *faith*. Little creatures that we are, we have our gesture to make which has its place in the scheme of things. We must find what it is and make it—offer up ourselves as a sacrifice. . . . I am sure one can't afford to be less than one's *deepest self* always. That's all I mean by renewing oneself—renewing one's vows in the contemplation of all this burning beauty. . . . Oh, I worship life. I fall on my knees before Love and Beauty. If I can only make myself worthy.

Finally, the premonition of her end wrought in her the consummation of her spiritual change, and she spent her last months in the peace of release and surrender, in the belief of a deliverance, the intimation of which she did not lose. She was now at rest, no longer divided, reunited with herself. And her supreme illuminations resemble those of Lawrence: "It is this life of the head, this intellectual life at the expense of all the rest which has got us into this state. How can it get us out of it? I see no hope of escape—except by learning to live in our emotional and instinctive being as well, and to balance all there."

"And to balance all there!" Those are the words which Lawrence would not, which he could not have used. He had not in him the root of that thought. And his violent, impassioned genius never bowed to the idea of perfection. The perfection of Katherine Mansfield's art is its assurance of immortality. The balance, the sanity of her mental being succeed in reducing to law and order the example of her agitated and suffering life. Distressing as they often are, her letters leave with us

a clean, fresh, healthy taste. They are the record of an essentially lovable personality. They attract more readers than those of Lawrence, and deserve more. Her sincerity did not stop short of herself, and turned all to the purifying of her art and the cleansing of her soul. Was she less creative than he? Her few volumes outweigh in quality his many books, diverse, powerful, vital, chaotic as they are. He had in him many elements of greatness; but on a more limited scale, she *was* great, in her pure devotion to a high ideal, which she attained.

RESEARCH IN EDUCATION

PETER SANDIFORD

THE phrase "research in education," when mentioned in the company of a group of professors of chemistry and physics, is apt to provoke sceptical smiles. Research to them means conclusions derived from the data obtained in controlled experiments. These experiments can be repeated by other workers and the truth or falsity of the conclusions established. But research cannot be so narrowly limited. There is research in history, in literature, in mathematics, even in philosophy and education. Any critical investigation in which the evidence is carefully weighed and evaluated is entitled to the name research. The main feature of research is care and accuracy—in fact scholarliness, and scholarliness is not confined to experimental findings, although it must be confessed that a reputation for scholarliness is easier to establish in physical and chemical laboratories than in most other places. But any investigation which brings into play those twin marks of the educated man, the weighing of evidence and knowing when a thing is proved, is research.

When is a thing proved? Obviously enough, proof in mathematics is more easily demonstrated than in any other branch of learning. It may be secured for all time by one man, providing his premises be granted. When Lindemann, in 1882, published a proof that the squaring of the circle was an impossibility, this one solution established the case forever. Similarly, it has been proved that the trisection of an angle is an impossibility using, of course, only compass and ruler. If, therefore, some crank now writes to an editor to say that he has

succeeded in squaring the circle or trisecting an angle, his manuscript may be deposited gently in the waste-paper basket without a single qualm or misgiving.

But a single person's *ipse dixit* in physics or chemistry is insufficient to establish a case. Rather must he give an account of his experimental set-up, his findings, and his conclusions. If his findings and conclusions are confirmed by a number of other skilled workers in the field, then, and not till then, are they regarded as authentic. Such repetition in physics and chemistry is comparatively easy; the material dealt with is inorganic and easily controlled. It should, however, be noted that both physics and chemistry are based on measurement and on mathematics, the science of pure number.

As we pass to the biological sciences, for example to zoology and botany, we get further removed from mathematics; we get into a realm where the variables are more difficult to control. We have reached the field of organisms, and truths about organisms are more difficult to establish than truths about inorganic matter. Still the ideal of research is essentially the same as in physics or chemistry since it is that of investigating the single variable. Psychology, including many aspects of research in education, may be regarded as the next step further removed from the foundational mathematics. Here we are dealing with human beings, and these, even to a greater extent than plants and sub-human animals, simply refuse to "stay put." This is the basis of the claim that research in education is so much more difficult than research in chemistry, in physics, or in the biological sciences. It is, in fact, the most difficult kind of research of the single-variable type that we have to-day.

But research of the single-variable type, which commonly is designated as scientific research, does not

exhaust the field. We may classify research into philosophical research and scientific research, into pure research and applied research, and in many other ways, but the fact remains that the claim, frequently made, that experimental research is the only kind possible, is quite untenable.

Turning now to our main topic, research in education, we find the field conveniently divided into four main branches, namely, history of education, philosophy of education, educational administration, and educational psychology.

In the field of the history of education the researchers, though not so numerous as in the spheres of politics and economics, employ exactly the same techniques that all historians employ. They meet with the same difficulties, and their findings and conclusions are judged in exactly the same way as those of any historian. Obviously, history cannot employ the experimental technique since historical data are all unique, all complete, and none can be repeated. Historical research singles out pertinent facts from the past and shows their implications for the present and future. Its success depends on the skill with which the historian selects his facts (for not all past events are of equal significance), and the use he makes of them in predicting the course of events. Time is the final determiner of the success or failure of the historian, and since he may predict the course of events beyond the span of his lifetime, he may, in this sense, never be brought to task. Yet we commonly judge the worth of his interpretations of past events from the skill he exercises in the selection of his data, and this is as far as we can go in "present time."

It is rather surprising that so few competent historians have devoted themselves to research in the field of educa-

tion. For, after all, the history of educational institutions is literally the history of civilization. In a broad sense schools are the repositories of the past; in them are conserved those things which have proved valuable to mankind. Although there are scarcely any records of the most ancient forms of educational endeavour, the educational sociologist, by studying existing primitive peoples—our contemporary ancestors—can throw some light on the probable course of their history. It is quite likely that the findings of W. D. Hambly (*Origins of Education among Primitive Peoples*) and Nathan Miller (*The Child in Primitive Society*) are faithful pictures of a type of education that was world-wide in prehistoric times. And what a flood of light is thrown on general history by research into the schooling of the ancient Chinese, Hindu, Greek, and Roman; by a study of the cathedral, singing, and catechetical schools of mediaeval times; and the educational effects of the institution of chivalry, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution. To come to problems nearer home, the full history of the struggle (fought out in Ontario) between aristocratic and democratic education, between protagonists so intensely interesting as Strachan and Ryerson, has never been written. For years I have been asking students to tell me the complete history of the Crown grants for education in Ontario, but so far in vain. Yet the material exists. Nobody has considered it worth his while to trace patiently one by one, the change of ownership of the various parcels of land, from public to private ownership, and the histories of the moneys secured by their sale. There is almost an infinite number of topics for research centring in the brief history of education in Canada. And the raw material is at our own doors.

Just as the philosopher at large studies the findings

of workers in all fields of intellectual endeavour and organizes their material into an intelligible whole, so the philosopher of education should unify education, determine its aims, and generally keep it in sound paths. We need to search for a sound philosophical basis for educational procedures; nowhere is that need so great as on the North-American continent, where the intense materialism of our life, which has developed through the rapid exploitation of a rich and vast area, has influenced education in a multitude of ways. Some of these influences are undoubtedly valuable, but most foreign observers note a lack of cohesion and an absence of guiding principles in the work of our educational institutions. We need a philosophy of education that takes into account not merely the economic environment of the North-American child, but also the ancient and proved values of art, literature, and science. Research along these lines must be restricted to those whose grasp of philosophical principles is secure, but, given this background, there is a wide field for inquiry into educational aims and principles. What is all this schooling trying to achieve? Why? What good is it serving? Is it a real and ultimate good?

Educational administration deals with the smooth and economical running of the educational machinery. *Efficiency* is its motto. The conditions surrounding the process of education should be conducive to success. In many of its aspects it is related to business and economics. The field of educational administration includes taxation and finance, the erection of suitable school-buildings, the selection of text-books, courses of study, supervision of teaching, and similar problems. The field of research in educational administration is very wide and, generally speaking, has attracted some of the best minds to it. True, the findings have seldom the degree of reliability

that attaches to experimental findings, but the conclusions of administrators are far more apt to touch the pocket of ratepayers than those of the historians or philosophers. Consequently it is important that adequate research techniques be employed if the taxpayer's money is not to be wasted.

Take, for example, the problem of school-buildings. The correct placing of these is dependent upon accurate forecasts of the trends of population in any given area. If "hunches" are followed or ward politics allowed to intervene, the effects are almost sure to be disastrous. If the Bell Telephone Company can make forecasts of population with a mean error of 11.63 per cent. and a weighted mean of 16.58 per cent. (so far the best forecasting that has been done), then it should not be beyond the powers of educational administrators to make similar forecasts for school-populations. Yet it is seldom done, and, so far as the writer is aware, no instruction in the techniques of the art is given to Canadian administrators. All forecasts of population trends are, of course, subject to error, for the estimates are based on the assumption that existing conditions will continue. Forecasts for a mining community (Cobalt is an excellent illustration) may be very wide of the mark and very costly to the community. After the school has been decided upon, the school-architect steps in to design a building best suited to the purpose. How frequently he fails is seen by Doan's investigation of the school-buildings of Toronto and the County of York. By using a measuring scale, scientifically constructed, which gave a maximum score of 1000 points to any building embodying the features of school-architecture recognized as best, he found no school that reached 1000 points and few that topped the 900 mark. Schools rating fewer than 500 points were all too common. Yet

every school built within the past ten years could have been erected without extra cost so as to rate 1000 if the best available findings in regard to school-buildings had been followed. Here is a field of research that is of a very practical character.

The field of taxation and the proper apportionment of school-funds is a never-ending source of topics suitable for research. Poor areas, thickly populated, need special help from government grants, and even the richest communities need to be encouraged to make special efforts for their pupils. Nobody knows at present what is the best method of levying, collecting, and apportioning school-funds. Research would undoubtedly lead to marked improvement.

As projects for research, the topics of school-supplies, their control, standards, selection, ordering, delivery, and storage, would probably be scoffed at by the experimental chemist and physicist; yet the fact remains that their solution has so far baffled the best brains of the teaching profession. Their solution is probably inherently more difficult than the routine discovery of a new organic compound or the investigation of a new line in the spectrum.

It is in the field of educational psychology (including measurement in education) that we come most closely to a true experimental science. Sir Francis Galton was a pioneer in the field, and the school of workers at Clark University did excellent work in child-study. Their main instrument, the questionnaire, was rather faulty, and the method has largely been abandoned. With care, however, the questionnaire can be made to produce valuable results. What was needed was a series of measuring-rods which would give comparable results. Binet's scale for the measurement of intelligence (1905) and Thorndike's

scale for the measurement of handwriting (1911) were early attempts at scale-making. Imagine the plight of the physicist if he had no thermometer and was dependent upon cutaneous sensitivity to warmth for the measurement of temperature. Yet Thorndike was emboldened to say that his scale measured handwriting as accurately as a ten-cent thermometer would measure temperature. This pioneering stage of measurement lasted until the middle of the Great War; since then the progress has been so rapid that it is exceedingly difficult to keep contact with it. It may be said without fear of contradiction that measurement in psychology and education is the topic which has made the greatest strides in the past decade.

Yet the average man, as well as the scientist and teacher, is curiously unsympathetic towards measurements whether it be in the form of intelligence-tests or of tests for achievement in school-subjects. Traditionally, the Anglo-Saxons have been specially distrustful of intelligence; they have always pinned more faith to the education of the heart (character) than to the training of the brain (intelligence and achievement). It is only recently that we have ceased to apologize for the scholar interested in intellectual things; we would much rather have had him conform to the traditional sporting type of pupil. So it was in France, rather than in England, that intelligence-tests were perfected; yet, strange to say, it is in the United States that they have reached their highest forms of development and most widespread use. Is it the presence of the immigrant that has led to this anomalous state of affairs? Since Binet's scale, intelligence-testers have devised tests for the deaf and the immigrant, group-tests for pupils of all ages, and individual tests for the babe and suckling. As a result of all this research, the

term "intelligence quotient," or its abbreviation, I.Q., is now commonly known by the man in the street.

New-type achievement-tests, as substitutes, either wholly or in part, for traditional examinations, seem to engender great heat in professional ranks and among the more conservative school-teachers. This is not to be wondered at, for, at first glance, an examination consisting of scores of apparently trivial factual items seems inadequate as a measure of the results they are striving to achieve. Teachers claim to be more interested in the development of intellectual power, of connected processes of thinking, than in the imparting of factual knowledge. The tests so far produced, they say, test none of these things. While we do not admit their claims (for there is abundant evidence to show that thinking as well as facts may be tested), yet there is one claim of the new testers that cannot be disputed, namely, that the traditional essay-type of examination cannot be scored reliably. The measuring-rod used—subjective judgment on the part of the examiner—is not a rigid unvarying thing, but resembles rather a yard-stick made of elastic. It varies in length according to the time of day, the physiological state of the examiner, and the number of papers previously marked. Instead of presenting the overwhelming evidence against the unreliability of the traditional examination, may I ask any doubting Thomas to conduct the following experiment with himself as the subject.

Take fifty examination papers in history (or some other subject normally judged subjectively), mark them according to the best methods, using a scale of a hundred marks, but instead of recording the mark on the examination book, record it on a separate sheet of paper. Lock the record of marks and the examination scripts in a safe for a period of two weeks. Then take out the fifty papers

and re-mark them using exactly the same scheme o grading as was used before. Then compare the two sets of marks. The chances are more than a thousand to one that the candidates will not be placed in the same order of merit by the two gradings, and more than a million to one that they will not receive identical percentage marks in the two successive ratings. Yet teachers and parents glibly talk of a 59 per cent. mark on an examination as if it were as unchangeable as the laws of the Medes and Persians and as reliable as the measurement of the transit of a star. As a matter of cold fact, an examiner is doing very well indeed if his successive ratings correlate more highly than .80, whenever subjective judgments enter into them. It is because of the absolute impossibility of being fair (reliable) when subjective ratings are used that objective tests are finding such favour. While, personally, I would always use a combination of the two types of examination, truth compels me to state that my objective ratings over a period of years of experiment with both types, have proved superior to the most careful subjective rating that I am capable of making. Analysis of my subjective ratings shows that I am prone to weight unduly the composition or style of the written answer independent of the worth of the contents.

But this article would leave a wrong impression if the reader concluded that research in education consisted wholly of measurement and of statistical refinements in interpreting the results. Experimentation in methods of class-room teaching is carried on extensively by researchers in education. Here the difficulty of controlling the variables is exceedingly great. There must always be a control group which is used as a criterion to judge of the success of the method under investigation. Such factors as the variability of the teaching, the intelligence of the

pupils, in fact, all errors due to time and space, must receive consideration. However, research techniques in teaching, such as equivalent group-methods, and better still, rotation technique methods, have been evolved to overcome some of the more obvious difficulties.

Even the character and personality of the pupil is now the subject of much serious research. Progress is slow because the task is difficult, but the methods used by Hartshorne and May in their *Studies of Deceit* show great promise.

To a much greater extent than was formerly the case, co-operative research in education is coming to the fore. Through the generosity of the great educational foundations, especially the Carnegie Corporation of New York, institutions of co-operative research have been founded in many parts of the British Empire. Most notable among these are the Scottish Council for Research in Education, and a similar body for Australia with its headquarters in Melbourne. Quite recently practically all the eleven-year old children in Scotland (87,498) were given an intelligence-test. The average I.Q.'s of Scottish boys and girls were practically equal, with the girls falling a little short of the boys' I.Q. of 100. The variability of the boys was considerably greater than the girls, being 17 points compared with 16. Instead of 60 per cent. of the Scottish population falling between 90 and 110 I.Q. (the figures accepted for children in the United States) only 45 per cent. so fall. Not fewer than 1½ per cent. and not more than 3 per cent. have I.Q.'s lower than 70, the usual line of demarcation between the normal and mentally defective children. This splendid piece of co-operative research was made possible by the professional loyalty of the Scottish teachers.

In England, C. W. Valentine has conducted an

extensive inquiry into the reliability of examinations, especially those for entrance into secondary schools and into universities. The award of numerous scholarships is made on the results of both examinations. The findings are gravely disturbing. A large number of pupils gaining scholarships for secondary schooling proved unworthy for the secondary-school course. On the other hand, some pupils who only just scraped through the entrance test proved highly successful; in a few instances, indeed, the last or nearly last became eventually the first of the entrance group. In regard to scholarship awards in the English provincial universities, the report states:

> Nearly two-fifths of the awards examined were given to students who proved unworthy of them, if we take as our criterion the attainment of at least second-class honours; and one-fifth of the non-scholars beat two-fifths of the scholars. On further analysis, it proved that the weakness was chiefly due to scholarships not awarded by the universities themselves. Of the holders of these, nearly a half prove unworthy of their awards. Of scholars selected by the universities themselves the proportion is one-fifth.

In Oxford and Cambridge only one-tenth of the scholars failed to justify their awards.

Since practically all these awards are based on traditional essay-type examinations and since an appreciable improvement was found to follow the introduction of mental tests and a systematic scheme for the marking of essays and other answers, it would seem to be a legitimate research problem for Ontario to see if our methods of awarding scholarships may not be open to improvement.

In Canada the beginnings of research in education have been made in various provinces. Ontario saw the inauguration of a Department of Educational Research in connection with the Ontario College of Education in

the fall of 1931. The Department is jointly financed by grants from the Ontario government and from the Carnegie Corporation in New York City ($30,000 spread over three years). This year the Carnegie Corporation, by a further grant of $15,000 extending over three years, has enabled the University of Toronto to extend an invitation to Dr. Michael West, late of the Indian Educational Service, to carry out some fundamental investigations in the teaching of languages. The other workers in the Department are engaged in making standardized tests in intelligence, standardized group-achievement tests, and tests in history, geography, physiography, and arithmetic. When these are completed, we shall, to a certain extent, be independent of the United States. At the present time thousands of dollars' worth of American tests are imported annually by teachers and administrators. It is the intention of the University of Toronto eventually to make the new Dominion tests available to all teachers at the bare cost of printing and distribution.

Considerations of space preclude the discussion of the work of such excellent research institutions as the National Institute of Industrial Psychology of London, England, which has done such valuable work for the industries of England, and, more recently, for the parents of England by testing in thorough fashion the potentialities of their children.

While all educational research is a very recent venture, enough has been accomplished to prove its value. There are enough problems in the lecture-halls and administrative offices of the University of Toronto to keep half-a-dozen research workers busy for a decade.

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN CONDUCT AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

H. W. Wright

THE inquiring student of a generation ago who wished to find out what conclusions systematic human thinking had reached regarding the proper guidance of life, in view of the nature of man and his relation to his fellows and the physical world, would unhesitatingly have been referred to the science of ethics. His dean or faculty adviser, particularly if drawn from the Department of Philosophy, might have given his reasons for recommending to such an aspirant the study of ethics. Ethics, he would have said, compares the different objects which men pursue as ends of action, decides which ones furnish the fullest and most enduring satisfaction, and considers how these most worthy ends can be realized in everyday conduct. Since it might thus be claimed for ethics that it alone among the sciences undertakes to say how the whole nature of man in its distinctively human and social capacity can obtain satisfaction, it is small wonder that in the older type of North-American college and university with its definitely religious bent the course in ethics, with perhaps one on "Christian evidences," was a culminating feature of the curriculum.

The student of to-day who desires light on the practical problems of human life and human association finds the field formerly assigned to ethics in great part occupied by other sciences. The social sciences have enlarged their scope and improved their methods with a consequent gain in influence and prestige. Psychology has had an amazing growth and has risen to a position

of commanding importance. As the result of scientific progress in these two lines, there has emerged a new science of comprehensive character, social psychology, which includes within its content not only a large amount of general psychology and physiology and sociology, but also a considerable portion of the subject-matter of ethics as well. A striking impression of the rapid development of social psychology is gained by comparing a treatise or text-book of thirty years ago in the subject with the kind of books now being written and published for students' use. To the former class belong such books as McDougall's or Ross's *Social Psychology*, relatively slender volumes of some three hundred pages, confining themselves to the mental dispositions and activities which in definite ways determine the social behaviour of men. The latter class of present-day text-books run to six and seven hundred pages and treat of such a variety of topics as the processes of human heredity, the physiology of the nervous system, the native action-tendencies of men and their early organization, the methods of language acquisition, the processes of imitation and suggestion, of wish-frustration and sublimation, of social conflict and adjustment, the psychology of social culture, of public opinion and propaganda, of social control and progress. It is not surprising that the student of the present day who has assimilated the contents of one of these compendious volumes feels that he has little or nothing more to learn about the guidance and conduct of life.

If the question were merely one of names and titles, it need trouble us not at all. The essential thing is to make headway in understanding human nature and conduct, and whether we call the resulting knowledge ethics or social psychology does not much matter. And

if traditional boundary lines between the different sciences are overstepped or obliterated, this may be cause for congratulation rather than misgiving. But much more is here at stake than merely names or time-honoured distinctions of subject-matter. For contemporary social psychology is annexing the territory of ethics in behalf, and by the authority, of a special method of investigation—the objective, experimental method of natural science. It confidently expects its explanations of social behaviour to supplant and supersede those of ethics because it believes that the triumphant advance of modern natural science has demonstrated their superiority to those advanced by moralists in the past. Historical ethics in its attempt to explain human conduct has always conceived of man as a voluntary agent whose actions are directed by consciously-chosen ends. Hence it found explanation of the important types of human behaviour and forms of social life in the ends or purposes they sought to realize or to subserve. Now social psychologists reject such "teleological" interpretation of social conduct as vague, mystical, unscientific. The true explanation of all forms of social conduct, along with the rest of human behaviour, is to be found, they hold, in their natural causes. These causes they conceive, in keeping with the standpoint of natural science, as physical events occurring outside the human organism and physiological processes taking place within it.

As psychologists understand human actions, they are always *re*-actions—responses evoked by external stimuli, but determined in character and direction by nervous structures or "stimulus-response mechanisms" in the human organism. Some of these stimulus-response mechanisms in the body of man remain comparatively

fixed and unaltered from birth. Others are greatly modified by the external influences of the environment. This modification is understood to be brought about mainly by a process, called "conditioning," by which new stimuli and responses are, as it were, grafted on to the existing stimulus-response tendencies through being associated with them by contiguity in time and place. Thus the principal task of one who would explain human conduct and social interaction is—as our social psychologists see it—to discover the causes which have so modified the native reactions of man as to produce his present social habits and render him capable of responding adaptively to the range and variety of social stimuli which act upon him. Great importance is attributed to the action of "symbolic," *i.e.* language, stimuli to which the responses of the members of the social group become conditioned. As evidence of the overwhelming faith of many social psychologists in the power of conditioning, the following may be quoted from a recent text-book:

> By means of such a shift of effective stimuli a person may be transformed from a good citizen to a criminal or from a loyal spouse or lover to the most inconstant sort of individual, and this change may occur without any act of choice, or indeed any clear understanding of the significance of the change, on the part of the changing personality.[1]

The elaborate attempts which are being made by writers on social psychology and sociology to explain the social conduct of men as the result of natural causes rather than as the expression of rational aims and purposes, are interesting and instructive. No less interesting is the fact that many present-day students are convinced by their university courses that such mechanistic ex-

[1] L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Holt, 1926, p. 276.

planations are the only scientific ones and that interpretation in terms of purpose and value are lingering survivals of an antiquated moral and religious tradition. Such impressions are, I think, unfortunate, since the causal explanations of social behaviour offered by "objective" psychology in the name of natural science are, as I shall later show, one-sided and inadequate. But this is not to say that they are either untrue or unimportant. On the contrary, I believe that they are indispensable to an understanding of human nature and social relations. After all, no one can deny that all forms of social behaviour are modes of motion, forms of bodily movement, which have their sources, presumably their specific causes, within the human organism. To acquire a detailed knowledge of these causes is to gain an understanding of the dynamics of human conduct. It would seem that such an understanding of the interplay of organic forces and factors which determines social behaviour should help to give flesh and blood to the bare, and possibly desiccated, skeleton of ethical doctrine. Let us, then, glance at the findings of objective psychology as they bear upon three outstanding problems of human conduct in its dynamic aspect: (1) the original action-tendencies of human nature and how they are called into play, inhibited, and reinforced; (2) the primary desires of man and how they are adjusted within the organized action-system of the individual; and (3) the social interaction of human individuals and how it affects their efficiency of performance.

II

What are the original springs of human action? Are there certain wants and desires felt by every normal man because they are part of our general human in-

heritance? This is a question which faces the investigator of human life and affairs whether his primary interest be psychological, economic, or ethical. Aristotle, as is well known, held that the mass of mankind look upon pleasure, wealth, and honour as the sources of human happiness. The Utilitarians grappled more closely with the question at issue when they advanced the theory that all men are predetermined by mental constitution to seek always and only *pleasure*. This view, defended by Bentham and Mill because they believed it to be based upon a scientific understanding of human nature, has, however, been abandoned as untenable by contemporary psychology. What conclusions has psychology then reached upon this question of the original action-tendencies or primary urges of man? The outcome of the years of investigation and controversy precipitated by Professor McDougall's instinct-theory, set forth in his *Social Psychology* a generation ago, seems to be that there are in human beings no innate action-tendencies in the sense he supposed. McDougall presented an array of evidence, certainly impressive if not finally convincing, that the human individual possesses a variety of innate impulses which are the sole original motives of human action. These are (in the list he first gave) the instincts of flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-display, self-abasement, parenthood, reproduction, gregariousness, acquisition, and construction. The verdict of psychologists is that the McDougall conception of instinct is untenable because it asserts the existence of human action-tendencies which are at once innate and goal-seeking. But, as psychologists say, only the nervous mechanisms which cause certain specific sensory stimuli to evoke definite motor responses can possibly be transmitted by the processes of heredity,

while, on the other hand, the goals of which we are commonly conscious (the objects which men naturally desire) are the outcome of social experience mediated by articulate speech. Thus the conception of instinct breaks in two: only simple reflex responses can be innate, while only acquired responses can be goal-seeking.

Furthermore, elaborate experimental studies of infant behaviour seem to prove that the original equipment of the human individual is limited to comparatively simple reaction-tendencies based upon established pathways of nervous conduction. Of these established reflexes there are a very great number, and while it may be a mistake to regard any of them as impulsive in the sense of being goal-seeking, certainly some reflexes are more influential than others in determining the direction of future desire. In this way, the food-taking reflexes are more important than, say, the winking or the sneezing reflex. Thus Professor Allport, who is particularly interested in explaining the development of forms of social behaviour, distinguishes six classes of reflexes as "pre-potent"—those of starting and withdrawing, of rejecting, of struggling, of hunger, of "sensitive zones," and of sex.[2] Such a list is a fair example of what scientific criticism has left standing of McDougall's catalogue of human instincts.

It is obvious that such elementary reflexes as struggling against forcible restraint, shrinking from injury, or even sucking and swallowing, cannot play the part which McDougall assigned to the instincts of being the sole and original motives of human behaviour. For these reflexes can act only when external objects furnish the proper stimulation, while motives are comparatively persistent in their operation, and regularly recurrent.

[2]F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, Houghton Mifflin, 1924, pp. 50 *ff.*

But facts have been recently discovered which, in the opinion of psychologists, go a long way toward explaining the physiological mechanism of motivation. These facts indicate, they believe, that motives are states of organic need and "visceral tension" which, as long as they last, lower the threshold of stimulation for certain reflexes, and thus predispose the organism to respond to particular stimuli when they present themselves, and by means of the response to satisfy the need and relieve the tension. Consider the hunger motive as perhaps the clearest example. The need of the organism for food induces chemical changes which affect the empty stomach and cause it to contract spasmodically. A tension is thereby created in the autonomic nervous centres (which control the activity of the internal organs), and these centres in their turn stimulate the main nervous system, which excites searching movements that continue until food is discovered, *i.e.*, the external stimulus is brought to bear upon the enlivened senses of taste and smell, which alone can evoke the eating response required to relieve the tension of hunger. Such, psychologists tell us, is the mechanism of the hunger-motive, and the physiological drive of sex is susceptible of a similar explanation. Thus, with reference to each of our principal wants, human behaviour may be said to pass through a regular cycle, from a state of well-being and inactivity to a state of organic need that induces restless activity, which continues until the object is found through which alone the need can be relieved and the organism be permitted to relapse into quiescence. Professor Thurstone reduces the behaviour cycle to what he calls the "self-expressive formula:" *human wants—the stimulus—conduct.*[3] This formula seems to have possibilities of wide application,

[3]L. L. Thurstone, *The Nature of Intelligence*, Kegan Paul, 1924, p. 18.

but its author gives it a strictly physiological interpretation, holding that the source of the impulses of the living self is the metabolism of the human organism, which is divisible into groups such as the digestive and the sex functions. In this connection, however, it is a noteworthy fact that, while some leading psychologists hold that all human motives are without exception visceral drives, there are others of equal standing who believe that there are many motives and interests to which the chemical and visceral explanation does not apply. As instances of motives dependent on the brain rather than the viscera, they cite the exploratory impulse (curiosity), the preference for certain colours, the liking for sociable company, the aptitude for, and interest in, music or literature or mechanical engineering.

The natural desires of men are, therefore, products of social experience. They are integrations of native reaction-tendencies brought about by the conditioning of these original reflexes to social and symbolic (language) stimuli, and they get their motive-power principally from states of visceral tension produced by tissue-needs of the human organism. Such, at any rate, are the conclusions of contemporary psychology. But what, the student of human conduct may ask, with some impatience, does psychology find that these fundamental desires are? A classification which is widely accepted among social psychologists to-day is that of Professor W. I. Thomas.[4] According to Thomas, there are four fundamental wishes which dominate the social behaviour of men—the wishes for security, for recognition, for response, and for new experience. This list, while it can make no pretension to finality, has features of decided interest. The wish for *security* reminds us of the "instinct

[4] *Cf.* Kimball Young, *Source Book in Social Psychology*, Knopf, 1927, p. 395.

of self-preservation" we used to hear so much about. It is an integration of a number of reflexes, that of food-taking, and such reflexes as minister to organic needs like those for shelter, fresh air, and rest, and the "fear" reflexes which cause shrinking from pain and injury. In civilized society the job has become the symbol of security, since one who has money can provide himself with food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. The wish for *recognition* is the desire to display one's abilities and have them recognized by others. In its objective, it is about the same as McDougall's instinct of self-assertion, or what other psychologists have called the mastery impulse. The disorganization of character which results from the protracted repression of this wish (in the well-known "inferiority complex") bears witness to its strength and pertinacity. The wish for *response* is the distinctively and exclusively social impulse. The response desired is from others—an expression of their interest and liking. This wish combines the two principal forms of social desire, the sexual impulse and that of general sociability or gregariousness. In both cases, what is desired is a favourable response from another. As Professor Hocking says with characteristic penetration, "what the social desire seeks is the social desire itself—in another person." The wish for *new experience* is a novel and promising candidate for position among the fundamental desires of man. It is, of course, allied to the so-called instinct of curiosity. It is, however, more general: not merely new knowledge but new experience—new scenes, new people, new pursuits—is meant. Perhaps the mechanical routine of modern civilization is bringing this wish to the fore and calling it to the attention of psychologists. Indeed, we now have psychologists pointing to the physiological basis of this general desire for change in

"something analogous to fatigue of particular central mechanisms."[5]

But to have a wish or desire is by no means to be sure of its gratification. Experience soon teaches man that, if he is to achieve even a moderate gratification of his principal desires, he must expect to adjust them to one another and to his situation in life. Moralists of every age have insisted that struggle and conflict are the necessary price of achievement in personal character and in social enterprise. The principle which they have laid down to govern the reasonable man in restraining and regulating his desires, is that of the "organic mean"—that each desire be permitted that degree of gratification consistent with the due and proportionate gratification of all other desires. While this principle is founded on reason and expresses the essential requirement for a rational organization of conduct, it is, nevertheless, highly general and lacking in pointed application to the concrete actualities of everyday social conduct. What has psychology to offer here? It can tell us of the physiological mechanisms which are operative when desires come into conflict with one another, and of the forms of behaviour which these mechanisms, working in conjunction with constitutional type-differences, tend to produce. Does such knowledge help us to steer a safer course when driven by winds of passion among the reefs and shoals of hostile circumstance? Suppose that it makes us more aware of dangers which threaten our personal poise and social usefulness in the vicissitudes of daily conduct and gives us practical suggestions as to how these dangers may be avoided or overcome? Does it not give us help, then, in bringing the general principles of ethics to bear upon the actual details of social behaviour?

[5] L. T. Troland, *The Fundamentals of Human Motivation*, Van Nostrand, 1928, p. 162.

In the first place, psychology informs us as to the powerful engine which operates in our own bodies for the reinforcement of primary desires which are threatened with frustration. Reference has been made to the fact that the vital organs in the trunk of the body which are sources of its life and energy—heart, lungs, alimentary system, and endocrine glands—are controlled by a separate part of the nervous system, the autonomic. Now when in the course of everyday behaviour, a strong desire or dominant purpose is thwarted by an external obstacle, physical or social, a division of the autonomic system, the so-called "sympathetic" division, is called into play. What it does is to bring about a suspension of the organic routine, and to stimulate the organs of circulation and respiration, and the endocrine glands, to prepare the organism for high-pressure emergency action. In particular, it causes the adrenal glands to pour their powerful stimulant into the blood-stream. The result of all these changes is to render the organism's maximum supply of energy available for combatting the obstacle. The internal upheaval thus produced is consciously reflected in the emotion of anger, directed upon the obstructing person or thing and intensified by an admixture of fear lest the difficulty or obstacle prove insurmountable. Two points are deserving of attention in connection with this emotional reinforcement of the human powers of action in times of difficulty and struggle: first, that this mechanism is extremely effective in preparing the human individual for action in case of emergency, and, second, that it is very exhausting in organic after-effect, because it places the heart and nervous system in a state of strain and profoundly disturbs the alimentary functions.

The frustration of any strong desire in the nature of man thus throws his whole psycho-physical organism into

a state of strain. The fact that these effects of frustration are most marked in the case of three impulses, fear (security), sex, and self-assertion (recognition), testifies to their fundamental nature. The emotional tension thus produced drives the frustrated subject to ceaseless activity (often of the trial-and-error sort) in order to remove the obstacle and bring about its own relief. But this emotional tension is too exhausting to continue indefinitely, and so is bound to obtain relief, if not by some action which successfully overcomes the frustration, then by what is called a "disabling reaction." This is some type of behaviour which, though it is successful in reducing tension, does so at the cost of increasing conflict in the general behaviour situation of the individual. If such disabling reaction occurs, the form it takes will depend upon the constitution and temperament of the individual, whether extrovert or introvert. People of the extrovert or objective type are usually very suggestible, *i.e.*, they respond very readily and without critical scrutiny to external stimuli, particularly to ideas aroused by the words and actions of other persons. By such a response to some external circumstance which happens to arise, a response unchecked by rational scrutiny or criticism, they obtain relief from the tension of frustrated desire. Thus a trifling bodily ailment which is sympathetically noticed by others may suggest a serious disease. This is the typical disabling reaction of hysteria, the acceptance of some symptom of disease as explaining to the subject and to others his own frustration and failure, and excusing him from any further effort. The facilities for forgetting offered by drink and drugs, by reckless driving and gambling, are effective in other cases as tension-reducers. The introvert or subjective type of mind finds relief from the tension of conflict in day-

dreaming or "autistic" thinking. This is thinking which proceeds unchecked by objective facts and creates for the individual a world of his own imagination, quite divorced from the real world, in which he can order things according to his heart's desire. If the subject is of the more passive sort, this disabling reaction takes the form of a withdrawal from reality into a dreamy life of self-absorption and delusion, in which the mind feeds upon its own resources, is drawn back toward the interests of childhood, and even (in extreme cases) to the preoccupations of infancy. If, on the other hand, the introvert has fight in him, he will use his imagination to find in the outside world some extenuating cause for the inferiority which his frustration makes him feel, but which he is unwilling to admit. He may seek compensation for his failure to achieve the object of his desire by achievement in some other line, and if he succeeds in this and finds it a satisfactory substitute, he will have turned defeat into victory, a disabling into an enabling reaction. Or less successfully, he may find excuse for his failure and a salve for his self-respect in the belief that he is the object of persecution on the part of personal enemies or of the social powers that be.

These forms of disabling reaction are, of course, the special concern of abnormal psychology; yet they come definitely within the scope of social psychology and of ethics as well. Psychiatrists recognize them as factors which contribute to the disintegration of personality and result, if unchecked, in insanity. But they are instructive to all students of human nature and conduct because they set in sharp relief the conditions and influences which affect the organization of activities in individual personality and in social life. For the disabling reactions referred to are not confined to the behaviour of a com-

paratively few neurotics. They are, we may note in the first place, forms of behaviour to which we are all, in a greater or less degree, liable under the stress of effort and struggle. Making some trifling bodily ailment an excuse for failure in performance, having recourse to some form of distracting pleasure in order to forget the perplexities and discouragements of active endeavour, taking refuge in idle day-dreaming as a substitute for real achievement, blaming others for one's private misfortunes—these are forms of human weakness from which few of us are entirely exempt. Then, in the second place, these psychoses about which abnormal psychology tells us, are only exaggerations or perversions of behaviour-tendencies quite reasonable and requisite in themselves. Hence, like every easy perversion of what is in itself rightful and necessary, they constitute an ever-present danger to intelligently directed conduct. It is reasonable and right to seek the object of desire—provided it is what one really desires and not what one has been led by blind impulse or social example to *believe* that he desires. It is reasonable and right to persist in the face of obstacle and difficulty—provided one is using suitable and efficacious methods and is not beating his head against the stone wall of physical and social fact. It is reasonable and right, when progress by preconceived plan is impossible, to seize every advantage offered by chance and circumstance—provided one is not carried away by casual suggestion and robbed of his rational self-possession. It is reasonable and right, when the object of desire proves to be finally unattainable, to seek relief and diversion through the activities and enjoyments of the imagination—provided one does not cultivate a visionary, impracticable habit of mind. It is reasonable and right, when the primary aim or object of desire

must be given up, to seek compensation through attainment of some similar or related object—provided one chooses the substitute on its merits and not to spite someone else and discomfit his erstwhile rivals and supposed enemies.

The third question on which we proposed to seek enlightenment from the experimental findings of social psychology, was that of social interaction and its influence upon individual achievement. To the contemporary psychologist who insists upon the objective approach, the social behaviour of human beings resolves itself into those responses of the individual which act as stimulus for others' behaviour, and those responses of others which call forth action from him. Even personality is to be defined in these external terms as the individual's characteristic reactions to social stimuli and the quality of his adaptation to the social features of his environment. Understood in this way, social behaviour can be observed under experimental conditions and measured. Such experimental researches are now being carried on with considerable success. For instance, recent studies of what is called social facilitation have yielded results that are worthy of attention. Social facilitation is the enhancement of individual activity produced by the presence of others engaged in the same task. Experiments are devised to determine whether such improvement occurs at different age-periods and in the case of different types of reaction, and, if it does occur, to measure the amount. As we might perhaps expect, social facilitation is greatest with children and in the case of motor performances, which show a decided increase both in speed and accuracy as the result of others' presence and participation. Adults prove to be less susceptible to this social influence, although it is generally

present, particularly in motor responses. In strictly intellectual activity the effect is not produced (indeed, others' presence is often a hindrance), but the overt responses connected with such activity as, for example, writing, show a definite social facilitation. So in one well-known experiment an increase both in speed and amount of work under group influence was shown when the "free-association test" was given to students, first singly, then in groups of five, the results being greatest in the first minute, less in the second, and least in the third. Experimental studies at the University of Illinois convinced the investigators that students seated in the centre, or just in front of the centre, of the lecture-room had a definite and measurable advantage in learning over those in the back row or extreme front, as the result of group-influence. To those inclined to scoff, it should be said in fairness to the investigators that they showed utmost care and ingenuity in excluding the other factors which will occur to the mind of any experienced university teacher as likely to affect individual performance. In explaining these effects of social or group influence, psychologists have been led to distinguish between facilitation proper, the "dynamo-genic" factor dependent upon the simplest mechanisms of imitation and suggestion, and a second factor, of rivalry, dependent upon prestige-suggestion. Undoubtedly both of these factors are more or less continuously operative in social life and are responsible for important features of social behaviour.

The technique of experimental investigation and quantitative determination is now being extended to higher fields of social behaviour, which involve the processes of consecutive thinking. So we have experimental studies of the advantages of group discussion and co-operative thinking under various conditions. A recent

journal contains the report of an experimental study of the effect of group discussion in changing the opinions of individuals on a question of fact.[6] This question concerned the number of beans in a bottle. "Hardly a typical intellectual problem," the sceptic will remark with a smile. "It may permit a measurement of results but is artificial and mechanical." Still it is a question which challenges opinion, and such opinion, if intelligent, must be based upon rationally acceptable grounds. In the first group under investigation, twenty-six subjects first made their judgments in private, then discussed the question for fifteen minutes in groups of three, and then were permitted to revise their opinions in the light of the discussion. The result was that twenty out of twenty-six improved their judgment, the increased typicality of judgment was quite marked, and the average change of opinion was greater among the women than the men. It cannot be denied that such results may have genuine significance, particularly in their application to methods of political and social co-operation.

III

Even such a brief and fragmentary survey as we have made, is sufficient to prove that experimental social psychology is making a real contribution to our knowledge of human nature and social conduct. Still the mechanistic explanations to which these experimental studies lead, impress us as inadequate, at least in the sense of being incomplete. Why is this? It is, I think, because of the neglect of the factor of meaning—intelligible meaning—in social interchange. We do not respond to others' actions and words merely as to stimuli

[6]Arthur Jenness, "The Role of Discussion in Changing Opinion Regarding a Matter of Fact" (*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXVII, p. 279).

of the external or physical sort. We respond to the meaning we perceive them to have. This meaning is not something which registers on us automatically when others' behaviour acts as stimulus to our sense-organs; it is something which has to be understood; it is the interpretation which we place upon their actions in the light of our own experience and the rational outlook we share in common with them.

That meaning in this sense is an essential factor which cannot be omitted from any explanation of social behaviour that pretends to completeness, has not been entirely overlooked by psychologists and sociologists. While the fashion of the day in sociology is to seek explanation of the forms of organized social life in the behaviour-mechanisms which cause them and to dismiss all explanation in terms of meaning and purpose as mystical and metaphysical, there are leading sociologists who see the inadequacy of such formulations. Thus Dr. MacIver in his recent work, *Society, its Structure and Changes*, refers in no uncertain terms to the unsatisfactoriness of pure behaviourism as applied to the psychology of social relations. Among psychologists, Professor Washburn, an outstanding authority in the field of animal behaviour, points out in a recent article that the most striking difference between the social behaviour of man and that of the lower animals is the presence in man of "ejective consciousness," which she defines as "one's idea of what is going on in other minds."[7] She shows that ejective consciousness is necessary to explain certain features of our social and moral sentiments, the difference between normal and abnormal suggestibility, the difference between the religious and

[7]Margaret Floy Washburn, "Ejective Consciousness as a Fundamental Factor in Social Psychology" (*Psychological Review*, XXXIX, p. 395).

the scientific view of the world, the difference between language and involuntary emotional expression, the essence of the creative impulse in art, and our sense of the comic. These facts, she says, "tend to show the inadequacy of a social psychology which would define social behaviour in man as reaction to the *behaviour* of his fellow-men, rather than reaction also to what he conceives to be the mental states of others."[8] Also among psychologists, Professor Bentley, in a different and interesting manner of statement, takes account of the factor of meaning in social relations. It is not the mental functions or consciousness he holds, which can properly be called social. It is objects and events which are social, and they are social when their meaning and significance imply more than one observer.[9] "As social meanings grow," he writes, "the observers of an object or event assume more and more the character of partakers—more and more the observers share the object."

It is true that the factor of meaning introduces a new relation, different from that of natural causation. *And precisely for this reason it must not be left out of account.* Causation refers to the external influence or action of one event on another in the physical world. Meaning refers to the relation of any element or constituent part to the continuing system which includes it. This system, as it first emerges in the early stages of intelligence exhibited by the higher animals, is that of the continuing vital interests of the living individual. Thus, when one of the apes in Köhler's experiments perceived the banana lying outside the cage, it is reasonable to suppose that he recognized it as something-good-to-eat. And when a stick was left lying between him and

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 402.
[9] Madison Bentley, *The Field of Psychology*, Appleton, 1925, p. 457.

the banana outside the cage, the ape with ready insight perceived the stick as something-to-get-the-banana-with. Classes of objects begin to be identified and relations to be recognized, in terms of their bearing upon the animal's vital interests. But meaning, as understood by human intelligence, depends upon the recognition of relations which hold for others as well as for self, and so constitute an objective system or common world. Hence to perceive the meaning of others' acts is to perceive that they live in the same world that we do—that their acts have reference to the same objective system, organized by the same relations, that our own acts do. It is to perceive that the changing succession of external stimuli signify to them, as to us, the existence of different kinds or classes of objects which endure and imply one another; signify to them, as well as to us, the operation and efficacy of distinctive forces and agencies which can be depended on to produce the same anticipated (or intended) results; signify to them, as well as to us, the existence of patterns of colour and sound and movement which, by their intrinsic harmonies, are expressive of the salient features of the world and our common human experience.

There are three forms of human behaviour which are outstanding as vehicles for expressing and imparting to others the rational meaning which man as an intelligent subject finds in his world. First, there is articulate speech through which the permanent relations of identity and difference, which give coherence and order to the world, are symbolized and expressed. Second, there is purposive action, which is an objective demonstration of the power and efficacy of actions and forces to produce an intended result. Usually we "perceive" the things people are doing. If we do not, our curiosity is piqued.

"What is he trying to do?" we ask, and are satisfied when we learn what result he is aiming at and how his actions bear upon this result. Third, there is the shifting play of facial expression, the gestures and expressive bodily movements, through which the personal meaning we see and feel in people and things gains expression. To how great an extent does our understanding of the minds of others depend upon the direct impressions which the changing patterns of facial expression and bodily posture which they present, make on our perceptive and emotional faculties! These three activities are, therefore, not merely modes of interaction and social adjustment between human individuals. They are agencies for signalizing and imparting the intelligible meaning which human beings discover in their experience. They are means of intercommunication between intelligent persons.

Thus it is that, when we meet a fellow-human, we look into the eyes of another for whom the world and the experiences of conscious life have the same meaning as for ourselves. Objects have the same character and interconnection, appeal to similar desires for attainment and satisfaction, are felt to have a like personal significance. This recognized community of intelligence between ourselves and others has momentous implications for social conduct. To recognize it is to acknowledge that others make the same demands on life and the world that we do, and with equal right. Rational consistency forbids us to claim more in the way of opportunity and satisfaction than we are willing to allow to others. This is the rule of justice which denies to any individual the right to claim for himself what he would be unwilling to grant to all others in similar circumstances. The community of human intelligence, once acknowledged, imposes upon the individual a special

obligation in connection with the exercise of the three activities just described as primary agencies of personal communication and discussion. In verbal communication, or discussion, it imposes the duty to be *truthful*, to be intellectually honest and candid. In the field of practical endeavour, it imposes the duty to be *productive and helpful*. In the nuances of direct personal contact and social intercourse, it prescribes *kindliness and sympathy*. In short, our community of intelligent outlook with others enjoins us never to seek power *over* them but only power *with* them. The rule of justice, if negative, needs to be supplemented by the positive principle of benevolence which directs us to aim always at mutual understanding, co-operative achievement, and intelligent sympathy with our fellows.

The authority of these social duties has been too often represented by moralists as that of an external power whose dictates have no relation to our natural desires except to set limits to them. So Kant maintained that the good will is the will which acts from reverence for the Moral Law and in opposition to natural inclination. But surely this is a mistaken way of viewing it. The social obligations just mentioned are norms or standards furnished by our common intelligence to guide and direct us in the efforts we make to satisfy our natural desires. In the case of the four desires referred to above, social duty prescribes that, in our pursuit of security, we shall not infringe upon the safety and comfort of others and thus weaken the stability of the social order upon which the security of all depends. In the effort to obtain recognition, social duty enjoins that the fame and applause we seek shall be that accorded to socially useful achievement. In our craving for social response, social duty directs us to seek this satisfaction

only from personal contacts in which the pleasures which others give us through their expressions of liking and favour are heightened by an appreciation of personal worth and a sense of personal comradeship. So far as the wish for adventure is concerned, social duty directs that this be sought along lines which bring genuinely new experience to enlarge and enrich the content of personal life, and that it do not merely exhaust itself in a restless search for new sources of sensory stimulation and emotional thrill.

The value, as well as the meaning, which objects have for human intelligence arises out of their relation to a continuing system which includes them and to which they contribute. The familiar objects of human desire, food, shelter, family ties, companionship, *etc.*, possess value because they serve the system of vital and social interests of man as a "social animal." These interests are determined in their organization by the conditions of individual existence and group-life; hence the values they involve are largely relative to physical and social circumstance. But there are other values which are universal and absolute in their appeal to human intelligence. They are so in consequence of the fact that objects, when conceived by intelligence, relate themselves to another system, that of the real world which is common to all individuals because the fixed relations by which it is organized are comprehended by all. Hence the values determined by these relations which give objects their rational meaning, are not those of individual existence or group survival, but of personal and social intelligence in the universal sense. Because objects disclose identities and differences of intrinsic character, they imply one another logically and are capable of being known. Because the forces and materials

of the actual world are jointly effective in producing dependable results, they are capable of being controlled and made subservient to rational uses. Because objects present harmonies of colour and form and tone and movement, which have a felt significance, they are capable of giving personal meaning to the feelings they arouse. Thus the real world presents to the intellect of man the possibilities of *knowledge* or *truth*, to his inventive and organizing capacity the possibilities of *economic power* and *social progress*, to his perceptual and imaginative faculties the possibilities of *beauty*.

Now these last-named values, by their appeal and authority exercise a directive influence over the development of human personality and the character of human association. Indeed the German "cultural-science" psychology finds in these values, distinctive of personal-social intelligence, the key to the organization of human personality. Thus Eduard Spranger in his *Types of Men* classifies the types of human character or personality according to their "value-direction," *i.e.* according to which of the three values in question is the dominant influence.[10] Hence he holds that the fundamental types of human character are the theoretic, the economic, the aesthetic, and the religious (in which the three foregoing value-directions are synthesized), and finds in the social conditions of all human life the source of two further values which determine two additional personality-types, the social and the political. It is true that such attempts to classify the types of personal character, to explain, in fact, the organization of personality, in terms of value and purpose, will be dismissed by "natural science" psychologists as arm-chair philosophizing—not psychology at all. But I do not see how a fair-minded judge

[10] *Cf.* Eduard Spranger, *Types of Men*, Eng. trans., Niemeyer, 1928.

could read Spranger's masterly exposition with its penetrating analyses, its wealth of apposite illustration and shrewd interpretation, and still doubt that the principles which guide him are essentially sound and capable of yielding genuine illumination. If we are to reach an understanding of personal character and personal relations, we must take account not merely of such differences in psycho-physical constitution as that between extrovert and introvert, but also of the different species of ideal value which appeal to man as a rational agent and direct his life-purposes.

IV

What shall we say of the relation of these two ways of explaining human character and conduct—that followed by present-day psychology of the objective sort, which seeks an explanation of all human activities in the physiological mechanisms that cause them; and that offered by moralists and still defended by some psychologists who explain what is distinctively human in life and conduct by referring it to the purposes and values it seeks to realize? On the one hand, we have the facts brought to light by skilfully conceived and ingeniously executed experimental investigations of human behaviour; on the other hand, we have systematic interpretation based on an insight into the rational meaning of human experience and activity. Surely the reasonable assumption is that the two modes of explanation do not exclude but rather supplement one another! One of the most remarkable features of organic evolution is the way in which the external environment comes to be included within the periphery of the individual organism. The higher organisms, and in particular man, acquire, as the result of continuous

interaction with their physical surroundings, a complicated variety of internal responses which represent, or symbolize, the environment as it relates itself to the survival and well-being of the individual and the species. Recent psychology has had amazing success in detecting and describing these internal symbolic responses in human beings; the minute, imperceptible movements of the speech-organs, the slight, incipient tensings and relaxings of the bodily musculature, the contractions of the smooth-muscle tissue of viscera and glands, the responses of sense-organ adjustment. What now do these "implicit" responses symbolize or signify? Radical behaviourists have made the mistake of answering that they symbolize only other responses, overt, adaptive responses of which they are the conditioned stimuli. Thus they shut psychology up within the closed circle of mechanical interaction, and lend support to that tendency in contemporary civilization which Señor Ortega y Gasset has in mind when, in his *Revolt of the Masses*, he says that the "mass-man" "does not *see* the civilization of the world about him, but he *uses* it as if it were a natural force."[11] Why should he not do so if civilization has no meaning except that which natural objects possess, of signifying the responses of motor adjustment which man must make in order to utilize and enjoy them? What these inner symbolic responses truly symbolize is the real world, with its orderly structure in space and time, its harmonious and significant patterns of sense-imagery, its enduring forms of industrial and political organization and institutional life. Thus man is not merely an intricately organized and finely adjusted system of motor reactions implicit and overt; he is also an intelligent individual who confronts from a unique

[11]José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, Eng. trans., Norton, 1932, p. 89 (italics mine).

point of view the real world, which reproduces itself in his consciousness and presents to him infinitely varied possibilities of contributing to the unity and variety of the whole. But granted that these two explanations of human conduct and association are both of them valid and illuminating, how are they to be reconciled with one another? This is a problem which has perplexed philosophers for many centuries, and, it is safe to say, will continue to puzzle them for a long time to come.

E. M. FORSTER AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE NOVEL

E. K. Brown

NOBODY but a maker of dictionaries cares to rush in with a definition of the novel. Most of us would agree, however, that in a novel things happen. Perhaps an empire collapses,—perhaps a reputation is made for broiling chicken. At all events something happens. Broad as its confines are, the novel appears to belong to the world of actions. The pure contemplative eschews action and would say—if he could be so false to his aim and discipline as to bother with explanation—that he has risen beyond the world of actions:

> He has outsoared the shadow of our night;
> Envy and calumny and hate and pain,
> And that unrest which men miscall delight,
> Can touch him not and torture not again.

The novel may, of course, record a man's quest of the contemplative ideal, the process of his transformation into a contemplative spirit. That is a happening just as his transformation into an air-pilot or a Marxist would be a happening. The struggle to become a contemplative, to repudiate the world of actions, is a part of that world. It is a subject readily amenable to the novelist; and in *The Fountain* Mr. Charles Morgan has recently shown how admirable a subject it is.

The central character in *The Fountain*, Lewis Alison, is an inexpert contemplative. He is diverted from the contemplative discipline first by a plea that he should captain the project of escape conceived by his fellow prisoners of war. Subsequently he is far more perilously

distracted by his passion and love for Julie von Narwitz, into whose intimate company he has been almost involuntarily thrown. Far more perilously, for Alison distinguishes between two kinds of sexual love, one of the flesh only and "spiritually valueless," the other, such as Julie arouses in him, "spiritually contributory." After an evening spent in the study of the *Phaedo*, Alison lies sleepless for hours, revolving the problem, and rests in the conviction that "a man's love for a woman, though one of the expressions of it be carnal, may be the very air in which his soul grows." Doubtless it may; but the soul is not thus to be disengaged from the world of actions. The dramatic force of *The Fountain* —and it is abundant—is generated by the impacts of Alison's love for Julie and the theory he evolves in its defence upon his resolution to ascend to the contemplative plane of being. At moments he does pass onto this plane, but the record of these moments is obscure. He is, however, never long away from the world of actions, and to the end of the novel he remains essentially a part of it.

In the Graf von Narwitz, Julie's husband, Mr. Morgan does present an expert, a very nearly pure, contemplative. At Narwitz's entrance into the novel but one "illusion" intervenes between him and the state to which he aspires. In his first conversation with his wife's lover he says: "Birth and death are solitary; thought and growth are solitary; every final reality of a man's life is his alone, incommunicable; as soon as he ceases to be alone, he moves away from realities." In a moment he adds, "falling into the tone of personal confession," that love, "like every other supposed sharing is an unreality, but it is the supreme unreality—the last that we recognize as unreal." Narwitz cannot in this first stage concede

with his whole being the unreality of his love for Julie; and just as long as he remains unable to concede it he remains a part of the world of actions and a dynamic character. But, without being told, he comes to apprehend the love of Julie for Alison and surrenders his desire to win her love for himself. In a sharp brief crisis he experiences the absolute of carnal desire, renounces it, and, the last impediment removed, disengages himself from the world of actions.

Narwitz, it should be said, enters the story, a disabled man, his wounds so grievous that only his desire for "the supreme unreality," love, maintains him alive. Free of this desire, his wife "become a shadow" and his love for her "a story that was told long ago," he passes into a phase of philosophic wonder, a phase "in which pardon and pity and condemnation and all the judgments of philosophy are fused in wonder." In this phase, expectant of death, he talks with Alison of the contemplative way in language which Alison himself, let alone the reader, cannot comprehend. And then he performs the only action of which he is now capable—he dies.

As a secondary character Narwitz is one of the glories of the novel, and the last phase, in which he is purely contemplative, is deeply moving. The reader's impulse is to protest that the novel should have been about Narwitz, not about his fumbling imitator. On reflection, however, one asks whether a novel about Narwitz in his last phase, in his ascent into the serene contemplative sphere, is conceivable. Can one transpose the qualities of a state of rest into the terms of narrative?

And pursuing this query one turns to the greatest master of the contemplative novel in our time, to Mr. E. M. Forster. From *Where Angels Fear to Tread* (1905) to *A Passage to India* (1924), all Mr. Forster's novels

are illustrations of a single idea—the chasm between the world of actions and the world of being. *Only connect . . .* is the epigraph of *Howards End* (1910); and the typical situation in Mr. Forster's fiction is that of the dweller in the world of being who tries to conduct himself in the world of actions according to his inner light, the light of contemplation.

The world of actions appears in his several novels in extremely varied guises: in *A Room with a View* (1908) it is a group of conventional women and clergymen; in *The Longest Journey* (1907) it is the family of a public-school master; in *A Passage to India* it is an Anglo-Indian station; only in *Howards End* is it a group of genuinely active people, city-men and their women-folk. Whether looking out over the muddy Arno to San Miniato and the enclosing hills, or from Chandrapore into the vivid squalor of an Indian town, or over the slopes and valleys of Wiltshire towards the grey spire of Salisbury, the dwellers in the world of actions are torpid, and inadequate to the subtlety of nature. No matter with what persons they have to do, whether with members of another race and religion and culture, or with members of their own family living under the same roof, they are obtuse and unshakeably complacent. To their honesty, cleanliness, sporting spirit, essential decency and justice, Mr. Forster pays his homage frigidly and reluctantly—but he pays it. He cannot, however, believe in their ultimate reality; and he cannot for more than a moment consider them with unrelieved seriousness. For him those who dwell in the world of actions are always trivial or ludicrous or both. Ronnie Heaslip may be caught in an immense misfortune: he remains throughout *A Passage to India* the "red nosed boy" at whom the Moslems gibe in the first chapters. Mr. Pembroke, in *The Longest Journey*,

is transparently conscientious, generous, and active; but the images which encircle his name are those of "the hierarchy of jerseys and blazers and the many-tinted bathing-drawers that showed how far a boy could swim." They are all of the stamp of Mr. Wilcox in *Howards End*, who "lived for the five minutes that have passed and the five to come: he had the business mind." They may succeed in seeing life steadily; they do not even try to see it whole.

Over against the contented prisoners in the world of actions are set the persons whose device is *Only connect.* Margaret Schlegel, the heroine of *Howards End*, is their representative as she reflects: "The business man who assumes that this life is everything and the mystic who asserts that it is nothing, fail, on this side and on that, to hit the truth. . . . It was only to be found by continuous excursions into either realm." Margaret means to keep the ideals of the Schlegels and yet adapt herself to the facts, to the "life of telegrams and anger," of the Wilcoxes. She proposes to ally herself both with those who have made England exist and with those who have made the existence of England a value to the world of being. Looking out over the south coast, Margaret asks herself whether England "belongs to those who have moulded her and made her feared by other lands, or to those who have added nothing to her power but have somehow seen her, seen the whole island at once, lying as a jewel in a silver sea, sailing as a ship of souls, with all the brave world's fleet accompanying her towards eternity?"

On this note of interrogation, the sign of a muddled mind, a chapter ends; and Margaret's misfortunes, her marriage to Mr. Wilcox and her fruitless struggles to let air into his mind and give him, so to speak, a room with

a view, flow from her inability to perceive, instinctively and at once, that the Wilcox way of life, the way of telegrams and anger, is an illusion, something which has only a pragmatic existence. It is the same story with Adela Quested in *A Passage to India*, a girl who resembles Margaret like a sister. The mental muddle which allows her to believe that she can ally herself at once with India and with Anglo-India is the source of her misfortunes. The same story again with Rickie Elliot in *The Longest Journey*. In the first chapter he introduces to his genuinely, if inexpertly, contemplative friend Ansell the girl whom he is later to marry: "Ansell remained absolutely motionless, moving neither hand nor head—and absolutely silent." When he is next alone with Ansell, Rickie curses Ansell for his silly rudeness. Ansell's reply is this:

> Did it never strike you that phenomena may be of two kinds: *one*, those which have a real existence, such as the cow; *two*, those which are the subjective product of a diseased imagination, and which, to our destruction, we invest with the semblance of reality? If this never struck you, let it strike you now.

If Rickie had only let it! He would have moved along his life on his own line, he would have remained clear and sound in his judgments and, above all, he would have been saved the long fool's errand which led him to the school of the three kinds of caning and the many-tinted bathing-drawers.

Margaret and Adela and Rickie and a dozen others of their sort are the Lewis Alisons of Mr. Forster's fiction. What of his Narwitzes? Old Mr. Emerson, in *A Room with a View*, and Stewart Ansell, whose wise rudeness has just been illustrated, are the most elaborate portraits of the true contemplative. The most elaborate—not the

most successful. For there are moments in which the wisdom of Mr. Emerson is no more than an echo of old Polonius and in which Ansell seems no more than the sort of don who should have outwatched the Bear with Robert Burton. In the portraits of these awesomely learned men, he does not succeed as fully as Mr. Morgan with the Graf von Narwitz.

Mr. Forster has, however, another way of dealing with the intractable problem of presenting a profoundly contemplative mind, a way as subtle as the subject itself. He employs it with Mr. Failing in *The Longest Journey*, with Mrs. Moore in *A Passage to India*, with Mrs. Wilcox in *Howards End*. It is his great addition to the technique of the novel, the element in his work which makes him irreplaceable.

With Mr. Failing he is less successful than with the two women; but then Mr. Failing was an unpromising subject, scarcely richer than Mr. Emerson. What is striking is Mr. Forster's achievement in making Mr. Failing so much more impressive than Mr. Emerson. It is purely a triumph of method. Not only does he refuse to let Mr. Failing act a main part in the novel, he refuses to let him act at all: he has Mr. Failing's body safe in the grave before the novel opens. Mr. Failing is an influence, now strong, now weak, but, in an unsteady way, gaining ground as the novel proceeds. Near the beginning we say, with some surprise: "But Mr. Failing is wiser and deeper than Rickie!"; towards the middle we go further and say "wiser than Ansell!" who, we had thought, was to be the incarnation of wisdom; in the last chapters we perceive that Mr. Failing's wisdom was of a kind not to be compared with Rickie's, not even with Ansell's pedantic insight, that it was wisdom flowing easily and continuously from "the life whose fountains

are within." It was wisdom strangely similar to Edward Carpenter's as Mr. Forster describes this in his essay *Some Memories*: a hatred of restlessness and of the mentally fidgety, and a disposition to break in upon someone's "intelligent if useless remarks" with a gentle "Oh, do sit quiet."

To Mrs. Wilcox and Mrs. Moore a small part is allowed in the action of the novels in which they appear. Let us note Mrs. Wilcox's first entrance upon the stage. Her two sons are quarrelling noisily on the doorstep of Howards End:

> "I didn't—I don't—"
>
> "Yes or no, man; plain question, plain answer. Did or didn't Miss Schlegel—"
>
> "Charles dear," said a voice from the garden. "Charles, dear Charles, one doesn't ask plain questions. There aren't such things."
>
> They were all silent. It was Mrs. Wilcox.
>
> She approached just as Helen's letter had described her, trailing noiselessly over the lawn, and there was actually a wisp of hay in her hands. She seemed to belong not to the young people and their motor but to the house, and to the tree that overshadowed it. One knew that she worshipped the past, and that the instinctive wisdom the past can alone bestow had descended upon her. . . . She did not ask questions. Still less did she pretend that nothing had happened, as a competent society hostess would have done. She said, "Miss Schlegel, would you take your aunt up to your room or to my room whichever you think best . . . ?"

Alone of the characters in *Howards End*, Mrs. Wilcox is always adequate to the subtlety of nature, is always able to ride the whirlwind as serenely as she presides at the tea-urn of Howards End. "She was not intellectual, nor even alert, and it was odd that all the same, she should give the idea of greatness." Very odd indeed, and very daring of Mr. Forster to attempt to validate the idea

without allowing to his character any action more dramatic than the episode cited. Without demur we nod assent to Margaret Schlegel's tribute, uttered when Mrs. Wilcox is in her grave:

> I feel that you and I and Henry are only fragments of that woman's mind. She knows everything. She is everything. . . . I cannot believe that knowledge such as hers will perish with knowledge such as mine. She knew about realities. She knew when people were in love, though she was not in the room.

As Mr. Failing, but far more powerfully, Mrs. Wilcox communicates an impression of a spirit differing in quality from her associates, of a wisdom incommensurable with their clearest perceptions and strictest reasonings.

I have said that Mrs. Wilcox does not reveal her greatness by any acts of remarkable significance. Nor does she speak with the tongue of a prophet or a sibyl: "Clever talk alarmed her and withered her delicate imaginings; it was the social counterpart of a motor-car, all jerks, and she was a wisp of hay, a flower." Without a shade of irony she remarks to the heedless incoherent Margaret: "Indeed you have put the difficulties of life splendidly. . . . It is just what I should have liked to say about them myself." Mrs. Wilcox does not put the difficulties of life splendidly: she perceives them too acutely to care to put them at all. She is content with solving them unobtrusively and effectively. Brilliance of speech, like energy of action, belongs to that life of telegrams and anger which Mrs. Wilcox transcends. Doing little, saying less, Mrs. Wilcox left no strong impression upon anyone except Margaret Schlegel, but Margaret's seeing eye "saw a little more clearly than hitherto what a human being is and to what he may aspire." For all the rest the death of Mrs. Wilcox was not the irreparable loss of a sage but merely the disappear-

ance of a kind, good woman, deplorably slack and somewhat colourless.

No more than Mrs. Wilcox was Mrs. Moore "the dear old lady that outsiders supposed." No sooner had she arrived in her son's house at Chandrapore than "India brought her out into the open." In the narrow confines of the club, the bungalows, and the official relationships between Anglo-Indians and natives, she felt stifled. "While we talk about seeing the real India," says Adela Quested, who stands in the same relation to Mrs. Moore as Margaret Schlegel to Mrs. Wilcox, "she goes and sees it and then forgets she's seen it." Alone late in the evening, Mrs. Moore leaves the station—the station with its bridge-games, its amateur theatricals, its trickle of small talk—and enters a mosque. Not as a sightseer. To her India is not a frieze, but a complex reality, alive and appealing. Before she leaves the mosque Mrs. Moore knows more of India than her son has learned in years of civil service. Not that Dr. Aziz—a characteristic Mohammedan whom she meets there—can tell her the facts or the principles of Indian temperament and action. Not that Mrs. Moore does or says anything that could lead him on to theoretic disquisition. It is merely that this red-faced and white-haired old lady, by virtue of being what she is, lights in his supersensitive spirit "the flame that not even beauty can nourish." Mrs. Moore lives on a plane where racial and national traits are irrelevant; and with delighted surprise Dr. Aziz exclaims: "Then, you are an Oriental!" She is out in the open, and consequently India lies open to her.

The mind of Mrs. Moore, although blurred at the edges, is more lucid than the mind of Mrs. Wilcox. At the time of her arrival in India Mrs. Moore is a Christian mystic. The impact of India—and specifically

of the charge of attempted rape of Miss Quested preferred against Dr. Aziz—unsettles Mrs. Moore's serene conviction. Mrs. Moore's original frame of mind is easily intelligible: she resents the responsibilities that link her firmly to the world of actions; she is distressed by the inadequacy of the earthly loves and friendships she has experienced or observed; she is indignant at the Anglo-Indian attitude towards the Indian as at any fact which goes counter to her deep conviction of the omnipresence of the Divine. So far Mr. Forster's task has been no more difficult than the realization of Mrs. Wilcox in *Howards End.*

The triumph in *A Passage to India* is the presentation of the spiritual crisis through which Mrs. Moore passes just before her death. So close to the Incommunicable is this crisis that when Mrs. Moore speaks of her spiritual state, her language is as elusive and broken as that of an oracle. No single speech of hers can produce its designed effect if extracted from its context but—this warning given—I shall quote one:

> Oh, why is everything still my duty? When shall I be free from your fuss? Was he in the cave and were you in the cave and on and on . . . and Unto us a Son is born, unto us a Child is given . . . and am I good and is he bad and are we saved . . . and ending everything the echo.

These are the rhythms of Melville; and the mood of Mrs. Moore, in this crisis, is analogous to the mood in which Melville wrote *Moby Dick*, full of tortured questionings and hopeless of escape from the darkness of doubt. In this mood, as Mr. Forster observes, "a spiritual muddledom is set up for which no high-sounding words can be found; we can neither act nor refrain from action, we can neither ignore nor respect Infinity." In this black mood Mrs. Moore dies.

And yet Mrs. Moore lives on. "I cannot believe that knowledge such as hers," says Margaret Schlegel of Mrs. Wilcox, "will perish with knowledge such as mine." The strange insight of Mrs. Moore survives, obscured and attenuated, in her daughter and her second son. Her immediate comprehension of India issues in her elevation among the Hindus to the status of a minor deity—a metamorphosis displeasing to her elder son in whose hierarchy of values a British matron stood far above a heathen goddess. Most intensely of all, she lives on in the mind of Dr. Aziz. To her younger son he says: "Your mother was my best friend in all the world." And after uttering this munificent eulogy he reflects, "puzzled by his own great gratitude: What did this eternal goodness of Mrs. Moore amount to? To nothing if brought to the test of thought—she had not borne witness in his favour, nor visited him in the prison, yet she had stolen to the depths of his heart, and he always adored her."

To define Mrs. Moore more closely would be to weaken her reality: it is enough to indicate that with her as with Mrs. Wilcox we enter the world of the Karamazovs and Myshkin and Raskolnikov. Mr. Forster, in his *Aspects of the Novel*, has suggested the impact that world produces upon us: "a sensation that is partly physical—the sensation of sinking into a translucent globe and seeing our experience floating far above us on its surface, tiny, remote, yet ours." "Prophecy" is the title of the chapter in which this remark comes; and at its outset Mr. Forster explains the peculiar sense in which he uses the word by drawing a contrast between George Eliot, whom he calls a preacher, and Dostoievsky, whom he calls a prophet. In a word, he says that while for George Eliot God is on the same plane as the very chairs and tables, in the novels of Dostoievsky one must change the focus when

one passes from chairs and tables and all the other paraphernalia of the world of actions to that other plane to which all the great Dostoievsky characters at some time ascend. Significantly, in speaking of Mrs. Wilcox, Mr. Forster remarks: "Yet she and daily life were out of focus: one or the other must show blurred. And at lunch she seemed more out of focus than usual, and nearer the line that divides daily life from a life that may be of greater importance." As the spirit of Mrs. Wilcox or of Mrs. Moore diffuses itself, the world of actions does indeed become blurred. Ronnie Heaslip and Mr. Wilcox, who had seemed to be chunks of the most solid reality, become unsubstantial fragments of the mind of Mrs. Wilcox or Mrs. Moore. Unlike the cow they are no longer there.

We are now able to answer the question with which we approached the novels of Mr. Forster. By applying his formula of a "change in focus" he generates the disquieting but convincing sense that more real than the world of actions is the dim and but partly comprehensible world in which Mrs. Moore and Mrs. Wilcox have their being. He starts his novel safely and quietly on its course; the plot and the protagonists are securely keeled in the world of actions; ordinary things are happening—there is love and talk and even marmalade and tea. Suddenly an island uncharted by dwellers in the world of actions looms up, alien and puzzling. The novel is momentarily thrown off its course amid general confusion and doubt whether the methods and standards of this world of actions are quite so valid as we had supposed. We are made sharers in the wonder which was the last experience of the Graf von Narwitz—the experience of which he could not communicate the essence even to Lewis Alison. And Mr. Forster leaves us before a door ajar and leading into a room with a view.

THE DEPRESSION IN AUSTRALIA

LLOYD ROSS

I. BEFORE THE DEPRESSION: THE STATE AND ECONOMIC LIFE

JUDGED by the extent and direction of state intervention, Australia before the depression was the most socialistic country in the world. Strong militant trade unionism in 1927 embraced 911,652 out of 1,566,841 employees of twenty years and over—the highest proportion in the world. Every State had had a Labour government, and Labour had been in power in the Commonwealth sufficiently long, in 1910-2, to set up a State Commonwealth Bank and to extend all the social reforms of the earlier Liberal governments. Around the individual had been built an armour of legislation, from maternity allowances, through childhood endowment and free education, to workers' compensation, old-age pensions, and widows' allowances.[1] Around the country had been built tariff and migration barriers to preserve the Australian standard against an influx of cheap goods and cheap foreign labour. Undertakings like railways and tramways, the post office, telephones, and hydro-electric development, were nationalized; in others such as canneries, banking, and insurance, the state interfered by its own competition to protect the consumer; in all trades humanitarian considerations limited profiteering by granting a minimum wage and legally-enforceable conditions. Australians, fresh from the horrors and the cramped opportunities of

[1]In the four years 1925-6 to 1928-9, there were 374 pensioners per 1000 of the population over the required age; for 1929-30, there were 412, and for 1930-1, 453.

the Old World, were determined to keep open the road to improvement.

Australia had her frontier period when land was cheap and accessible and gold was plentiful and alluvial. But, despite its size, Australia was not suited for open-waggon expansion. Very early the opportunity of obtaining cheap land was closed, partly by the large holdings of first arrivals, but chiefly because capital was required to exploit the open spaces, which were very difficult of access and very liable to droughts and floods.

Political democracy was won early: English Chartists obtained the essence of their six points. The Australian people interfered with industrial development, not merely because the democracy followed the easy route of compelling the state to help by giving pensions and subsidies and by cutting up large estates, but also because the difficulty of raising capital by private individuals made it inevitable that the very necessary developmental work of building railways, roads, and hydro-electric systems should be done by the state. While the Labour party was influenced by the socialism of Bellamy, by the Fabians, by popular Marxians, and by European immigrants, its doctrines of state intervention were applied because the spirit and movement of the whole Australian people were controlled by the general practice of calling on the state to solve all problems that faced any group large enough to have decisive votes. The best approach for the student of Australian socialistic development is by contrast with American development; it is sufficient here to emphasize that despite the subdued warnings of many economists and the limited criticisms of those not being assisted at the moment, Australia entered the depression with

an intense faith in the efficacy of the state to control economic and social conditions.

Until the depression, expansion of production and plentiful borrowing made the Australian accustomed to an improving standard of living, which he was determined to defend at all costs. So interwoven with Australian thought had become the belief in the power of state action to secure rising standards that Australians began to think that state action was independent of economic conditions. According to the comparison made for the International Labour Office by Mr. J. H. Richardson, the Australian standard was the next in the world after that of the United States and Canada. Judged by ease of work, state social services, and absence of great and obvious inequality, the standard was probably the highest—at least the Australian said it was. To-day economists are claiming that Australia will be the first country to take advantage of world recovery. One of them writes:[2]

> My theme is that the wrangling style we affect has not cramped action, that on the threshold of 1933, we can look back to a well-knit campaign against financial bugbears, a campaign in which all Australian groups have served their "bit" in the front line and which, though marked by losses, has won back valuable ground. The Australian wholesale price level has been held steady in 1932, Australian credit has turned from weakness to strength, the nation's health has improved, its confidence in itself has returned and has brought increase in both trade and employment.

Have we this victory for democracy, that when an Australia, accustomed to solving its own problems by state intervention, met with a depression, there was a quiet and conscious planning, a scientific appraisal of

[2]In the circular of the Bank of New South Wales, Jan. 31, 1933.

the situation, and a determination to follow ruthlessly but unitedly wise measures for escape?

In ten years, 1919-29, the so-called reproductive debt of the Federal and State governments had almost doubled—governments had borrowed for purposes other than the war, 391 million pounds. In 1929 the total debt (excluding War debt) amounted to 815 millions; the burden of interest was 40.32 millions; the capital debt of the railways was 324 millions, and interest absorbed 31.66 per cent. of the total earnings; governmental expenditure was 202 million pounds, a growth from 1919 of 105 millions (or 93.3 per cent.), while population was growing from 5.2 millions to 6.4 millions (or 23.07 per cent.). Instead of a far-sighted democracy planning economic development along the best channels for a new sprawling land, the economist and the critic saw a hungry electorate being bribed by doles and bonuses, tariffs and excises that were producing inefficiency, waste, vested interests, and a reckless disregard of economic reality. The ideal of the state's arbitrating between the contestants in industrial disputes had become expanded into the complete regulation of all industrial life. Wages were decided not by economic needs but by the frequently irrelevant living wage. Elasticity was lost; unemployment increased. The employer was hindered not merely because his every act was circumscribed by statutes and legalized trade unionism, but because the State's wage-regulation methods were played off against the Commonwealth's, his employees were not merely under different awards and regulations but these were frequently changed both by the court and by recourse to different tribunals.[3]

The wage-regulation problem was but one instance

[3]Such is Dr. F. C. Benham's indictment in *The Prosperity of Australia*, London, 1928.

of the problems complicated by the Australian constitution. Because Federation came with States still jealous of one another, the model followed was that of the United States—certain named powers being given to the Commonwealth, the residue remaining with the States. While some of the problems of inter-State industrial competition have been avoided by the continent-wide desire for an improved standard, the complexity and uncertainty of the law, the division of responsibility and activity, had produced difficulties in every department of Australian life, from railways to marriage and divorce, from industrial legislation to the distribution of population. The High-Court judges responsible for a change of emphasis towards the supremacy of the Commonwealth showed more appreciation of present-day needs than the public, which, consulted by referenda, negatived twelve proposals submitted between 1911 and 1926 for the purpose of settling conflicts between parliaments by handing over clearer and wider powers, especially in commerce and industry, to the Commonwealth.

Two main parties in Australia contend for supremacy. The Party of the Right under changing names and sometimes divided into country and city elements, gains its support from the manufacturers and landowners, and poses as the defender of private property. The Party of the Left, based on the trade unions, is socialistic and is more insistent in introducing reforms and interfering with industry. Before the depression, then, the main problems in Australia were concerned with the relation of the state to industry—whether the state should withdraw from its interference or should continue in a haphazard way to meet every problem by giving a dole. There was no third alternative of planned interference, since the Labour party, which had socialization as its

objective, had adopted the principle that socialism meant assistance for everyone under capitalism.

II. The Coming of the Depression

The fall in prices of Australian exports and the cessation of oversea borrowing were the immediate causes of the fall in the Australian income. Wool constituted 42.2 per cent. of the total value of exports—and wool fell 50 per cent. in 1929-31. Wheat and flour amounted to 19.1 per cent. of the total, and wheat fell by 60 per cent. between 1929 and 1931. The Australian export-price index fell from a base of 1,000 in 1928, to 836 in 1929, 628 in 1930, and 567 in 1931. In four years, loan expenditure on public works fell by nearly 75 per cent., and another element in Australia's prosperity collapsed. The total value of imports fell from 148 million pounds in 1927-8, to 44 millions in 1931-2. At the same time, with the fall in prices, the relative importance of the oversea interest-charges in the balance of payments had risen to 35 millions in 1927-8, compared with the total exports for the same year of 143 millions.

While different estimates of the decline may disagree, there can be no doubt that the fall in national income was grave enough, ranging from 15 to 20 per cent. The social consequences may be seen from the following tables.

Year	Unemployed Numbers (and per cent. of trade unions recording)	Trade Unionists (per cent. of male members on estimated total male employees over twenty)	Industrial Disputes. Number of Disputes (men involved)	Marriages
1912	..... (5.6)	.....	.....	.....
1926-7	.....	.....	.....	.....
1927-8	.....	911,652 (62.6)	441 (200,757)	.....
1928-9	45,669 (10.8)	911,541 (60.9)	287 (96,422)	48,592
1929-30	47,359 (11.1)	901,168 (59.4)	259 (104,604)	47,501
1930-1	84,767 (19.8)	855,757 (56.0)	183 (54,222)	43,255
1931-2	117,866 (27.4)	769,006 (47.7)	134 (37,667)	38,882
1932-3	120,454 (29.0)	.....	127 (32,917)	43,634

Year	National Income £	Retail Price Index. 1927-8 as 1000	Loan Expenditure £
1926-7	642,000,000	994	.....
1927-8	650,000,000	1,000	43,687,000
1928-9	645,000,000	1,005	40,021,000
1929-30	556,000,000	1,005	29,836,000
1930-1	459,000,000	889	15,150,000
1931-2	430,000,000	810	8,000,000
1932-3	.....	.....	.....

There were two main conflicting views on the policy to be followed: that of the economists, and that of the Labour party and the trade unions.

The economists adopted this principle as basic: "The starting point in economic discussion must be the national income. . . . The ultimate source of private incomes is the amount of the national income."[4] The national income had fallen. Therefore the only question to be discussed immediately was the incidence of this fall: "How best could this be spread over the community so as to promote a rapid recovery?" Leaving aside the question whether the pre-depression division of reward was the best economically and ethically, they were content to demand, in April, 1930, that the loss of real income, so far borne chiefly by the unemployed and the agricultural community, should be distributed more evenly: "Some fall in profits and real salaries and wages is inevitable."

While opposing all forms of currency inflation, the economists at last supported a high exchange-rate to provide the exporter with a bonus, and check the fall in prices. While frequently declaring that budgets must be balanced, they were later prepared to extend the time

[4]D. B. Copland, *The Australian Economy*, Sydney, 1931, p. 1. See also E. R. Walker, *Australia in the World Depression*, London, 1933; E. O. G. Shann and D. B. Copland, *The Battle of the Plans*, Sydney, 1931; E. O. G. Shann and D. B. Copland, *The Crisis in Australian Finance*, Sydney, 1931; E. O. G. Shann and D. B. Copland, *The Australian Price Structure*, Sydney, 1933.

within which this was to take place. While arguing that the difference between the fall in the price which the primary producer obtained and the costs which he incurred, was a grave source of disequilibrium, they could not push their cure further than a ten-per-cent. reduction in the real wage, a reduction frequently argued from grounds of justice rather than economic necessity. Finding it impossible, politically and socially, to deflate so as to balance budgets or considerably to reduce unemployment, they were content to demand some reductions of the standard of living while placing more and more emphasis on a policy of preventing the drift in the public finances, and of regaining, by propaganda, financial confidence. Commenting on the advice given by Professor Gregory and Sir Otto Niemeyer, Professor Copland, who may be regarded as the leader of the Australian economists, wrote in the *Economic Journal*:[5]

> When he was in Australia, Sir Otto Niemeyer urged Australia to balance her Budget in one year. I did not agree with the action of the Australian governments in rejecting Sir Otto's advice almost in toto, but I would have been equally opposed to any policy that had attempted Budget balancing in one year. Its deflationary effects would have been disastrous. I find myself in agreement with Gregory in his article in the Circular Letter of the Royal Bank of Canada of October, 1931, where he referred to the need for central banks to finance Budget deficits through central bank credits. This is not inflation, provided Budget balancing is in sight and prices do not rise above their pre-crisis level. It is a legitimate and sound measure to stave off the worst evils of deflation.

Professor Copland was setting up his own definition of "inflation" to meet the difficulties of a political situation, in which the Labour party was supporting inflation as an alternative to wage-reductions.

[5]Sept., 1932, pp. 378-9.

Trade unionism saw neither the justice of, nor the need for, a reduction of the standards of living. Was not the total production in Australia greater than ever? Should not the standard of living be rising when everywhere there was abundance? Ignoring the fall in Australia's national income, and the part which supply and demand played under capitalism, the trade unionists argued in terms of a socialist state. Believing that purchasing power had been restricted by banks, they called on governments to increase the note-issue. While the Report of the Unemployment and Immigration Committee of the central trade union body (The Australasian Council of Trades Unions) declared that unemployment was inherent in the capitalist system, it also believed that "the nature and the degree of unemployment are determinable to a considerable extent by factors within the present economic system that are controllable." So the Committee proposed the introduction of a Federal scheme of unemployment insurance, protection to the point of prohibition against goods coming into Australia, provision against the export of goods that could be treated in Australia, nationalization of banking, public works on the day-labour principle with preference to unionists, and settlements of unemployed workers organized on community lines with application of the pooling principle. Trade union policy was simple enough: to oppose all reductions in standards, to keep wages up, and to lower working hours.

Since the Labour party was in control of the Commonwealth and the Labour party was dominated by trade unionists, how could the economists enforce their views?

The instrument used by the economists was the Loan Council. Leaving aside the account of the pre-

liminary negotiations and the slow, relentless pressure of the Commonwealth on the States, due to the increased taxing area belonging to the Commonwealth, we reach an amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution, as it has been amended, empowers[6] the Commonwealth to make agreements with the States with respect to the public debts of the States, including: (a) the taking-over of such debts by the Commonwealth; (b) their management; (c) the payment of interest and the provision and management of sinking funds in respect of them; (d) borrowing by governments. The Constitution further authorizes[7] the Commonwealth parliament to make laws for the carrying out of any such agreement, and makes[8] such an agreement binding on the Commonwealth and the States which are parties to it, notwithstanding anything in the Commonwealth Constitution or any State Constitution or in any law of the Commonwealth or any State. Under a Financial Agreement[9] there was set up a Loan Council, consisting of one representative of the Commonwealth government and one representative of each State, the Commonwealth representative having two votes and a casting vote, and each State representative one vote, controlling, in fact, practically all public borrowing by the Australian governments whether internal or external, and whether in the form of long-term loans or of temporary bank overdrafts. We have already noted the dependence of the Australian financial structure on government finance. At the beginning of the depression all the governments were depending heavily upon the banks for overdraft accommodation to meet revenue deficits. Although under

[6]Subsection 1 of section 105A (a new section).
[7]Subsection 3.
[8]Subsection 5.
[9]Made in pursuance of section 105A.

the Agreement borrowing solely for temporary purposes was excluded from the control of the Loan Council, the banks, afraid of the influence of huge deficits on the financial structure, insisted that, as from the end of 1930, all governmental borrowings should be made from the Commonwealth Bank and secured by Treasury bills. Not merely, therefore, did the Loan Council obtain the power of regulating the pace and direction of the capital development of the whole country, but events proved that it could enforce its own policy against governments and people, and in ways involving the details of internal administration.

III. Events in Australia

Labour came into power in the Commonwealth at the end of 1929. Mr. Scullin was Prime Minister; Mr. E. G. Theodore was Treasurer until he resigned when charges were brought against him of corruption during his term of office as Premier in Queensland. The budget of July 9, 1930, proposed to raise money by increased taxes, to continue borrowing, although it should have been apparent that revenue was falling rapidly behind expenditure and that further borrowing would be difficult. Neither in the parliament nor among Labour spokesmen outside was there any recognition of the difficult financial position. If capitalism tumbled that would prove Labour's claim that only by socialism could security be ensured; if profits fell, that was not Labour's concern; if unemployment increased, more imports should be banned. Mr. Scullin's report to the Commonwealth Labour Conference said: "Our immediate problem is to find a means of replacing the income we have lost overseas through the reduced value of our wool-clip. As a first step to the restoration of a

normal economic position, we must as far as possible decrease our imports, and increase the production of exportable goods for which a demand exists." The Conference passed a report of the Unemployment Committee stating that the restriction of credit was a cause of unemployment in Australia and demanding that the Commonwealth Bank should release the necessary credit. As the depression continued, and as imports began to fall, this became the main emphasis of Labour policy.

Then, less than a year after the Labour party had been returned on a promise to resist reductions, Sir Otto Niemeyer, sent out by the Bank of England on the invitation of the Labour government to discuss Australia's financial position, told the Australian Treasurers assembled in Melbourne, that Australian credit was at a low ebb, the budget deficits were large and increasing, the balance of trade was unfavourable, and the prices of primary products were likely to fall faster than other prices. "There is also evidence to show that the standard of living in Australia has reached a point which is economically beyond the capacity of the country to bear without a considerable reduction of costs resulting in increased per capita output." Unemployment was increasing. "The margin of those who have to be carried neutralises in the total the advantages of those who are fully employed, and this process must increase unless an adjustment is made enabling a larger number to share in the total dividend." They should jointly and severally undertake to balance their budgets in the financial year 1930-1. In that event he hoped that the London money-market might be induced to assist with further loans. He emphasized the importance of realizing that the balancing of budgets was only the

first step in economic readjustment, and that fundamental changes in lowering costs of production and adjusting the Australian price-level to that prevailing in other parts of the world were essential.

The Australian Loan Council unanimously agreed to carry out Sir Otto's recommendations. Labour premiers agreed to balance their budgets. Balancing was to be effected on such a basis as would be consistent with the repayment or conversion in Australia of the existing internal debt maturing in the next year. No further oversea loans were to be raised until after the oversea short-term indebtedness had been dealt with. Loans raised internally were to be restricted to work which would yield sufficient revenue to cover interest and sinking fund on the debt.

Into the paradise of the Australian standard of living had come the "Bailiff of London Jewry" as the *Labor Daily* called Sir Otto. "Shall Outsiders rule us?" asked the *Australian Worker*. "To have Sir Otto Niemeyer attending Cabinet meetings and Government conferences—to have an outsider influencing the political and economic policies of our elected rulers, is a humiliation that should not be tolerated by a proud and democratic people." When the Labour Premier of Victoria began to take steps to carry out the Niemeyer proposals, he was attacked by a special Labour conference for his failure to adhere to the Labour principle that the standard of living should not, in any circumstances, be reduced. Although the Commonwealth government had agreed to the Niemeyer proposals, four of the ministers assisted in the State elections of New South Wales, which the Labour party, under Lang, was fighting on the policy of no retrenchment, no reduction in standards, and the scrapping of the agreement. Labour won. Federal

Labour moved to the left. Mr. Theodore argued that by the judicious extension of credit, increased purchasing power in Australia would be created, bringing a revival of internal trade and the opportunity for secondary industries to take advantage of the increased tariff protection; the attempt of the Australian banks to restore the Australian pound to par with the English pound sterling should be abandoned because it was causing so drastic a curtailment of credit and purchasing power as to threaten the progress of business and industry; the budget could not be balanced without causing greater evils than existed at the time. Various proposals for inflation and postponement of external interest were circulated.

It is unnecessary to trace the steps by which the Labour Commonwealth government, unable to attempt direct inflation because of the Upper House, and unable to persuade or compel the Commonwealth Bank to lend more money to meet necessary governmental expenditure, was compelled to agree to the Premiers' Plan, which was a product of the investigation and advice of the economists. The five points of the Plan were: (1) a reduction of 20 per cent. in all adjustable governmental expenditure as compared with the year 1929-30; (2) the conversion of the internal debts of the governments on the basis of a 22 per cent. reduction of interest; (3) the securing of additional revenue by taxation, both in Commonwealth and State; (4) a reduction of bank and savings-bank rates of interest on deposits and advances; (5) relief in respect of private mortgages. An all-round reduction of costs was intended. The Arbitration Courts reduced wages; the banks lowered interest; the holders of internal loans were to convert voluntarily or by compulsion. The Plan was enforced. Labour generally opposed it.

In New South Wales further divisions inside the Labour party had broken out when, on February 9, 1931, Lang outlined his plan before the Conference of Premiers at Canberra: the suspension of payments on external loans, pending a readjustment of obligations, the reduction of interest on internal loans to three per cent., and the replacing of the gold standard by a "currency based on the wealth of Australia, to be termed the goods standard." His plan was amended, and interpreted by himself in different ways. He was compelled to reduce wages and cut down social services, but because he also refused to pay external interest, and had resisted as long as possible, had interfered drastically with private property, and had been most eloquent in his denunciation of money-lenders and capitalists, he received increased support, while other Labour leaders were attacked and expelled. His plan must not, therefore, be regarded as important in its details but merely as showing the minds of a large number of Australians. Lang blundered; he failed to anticipate the moves of his opponents: accusations of rotten appointments and of corrupt practices clouded the air. He split the Labour party in New South Wales, but always he recovered his popularity by a phrase of revolt and a legislative act of defiance. His legislation, as a step to socialism, is as futile as previous acts of Labour governments, but interpreted as a rearguard action against capitalism, it won ever-increasing applause. "At last Labour had produced a leader who was not afraid to defy moneyed interests." His greatest mistake was to break with the Federal Labour party and defy the Federal institutions. The average Labour supporter was bewildered by the divisions. He could see no difference in the speeches of the Federal party and those of Lang; he saw Lang more consistent,

more courageous, more logical, and so more satisfactory. Election results showed that he was supported overwhelmingly by Labour in New South Wales, and he failed elsewhere only because he had disobeyed the party machine. Labour was afraid of the political consequences of repudiation, although few had moral scruples; but the deepening of the depression, the constant drive for retrenchment and economies, the refusal still to accept a lower standard of living, and the alleged timidity of the Federal Labour party, were pushing the movement further and further to the left.

The Commonwealth Labour government which carried through the Plan was defeated in parliament on the initiative of the Lang group and was annihilated by the electorate. In Victoria, the Labour Premier, who persisted in fulfilling his obligations under the Plan, was expelled by his executive, and the Labour movement demanded that no further reductions be accepted. Defeat at the elections followed. In South Australia, the Labour party split into four groups, leading to defeat. In Queensland and in West Australia, Labour was not in office to enforce the Plan, and so not merely kept unity inside the party, but won power in the next elections. In New South Wales, Lang resisted as long as possible, until the new Federal government dried up his sources of revenue and the State Governor dismissed him. The grounds of dismissal were that he had issued a circular to the heads of departments directing them to disobey the Commonwealth proclamation for the attachment of State moneys and their payment into the Commonwealth treasury. The following election was unequalled in Australian history for the passions and fears aroused. War-time precedents were too frequently quoted. Crazy groups of currency-reformers

produced numberless schemes, and blamed the banks both for the economic crisis and the armed movement against Lang. A Nationalist member of parliament called attention in sensational terms to the weakness of Australian defences. Labour papers revived the fears of Japan. Suspicion flared out in rumours and accusations about Japanese intrigues in the Pacific. Democracy can function only in a reasoning political atmosphere, and such an atmosphere during these months was wholly lacking. Democracy can function only if both sides respect the decision of the electors. Labour opponents expressed more and more the belief that the implications of democracy left no place for Lang. Lang was defeated.

IV. The Results of the Depression

Political democracy suffers from the centralized external control of the Loan Council on the one hand, and the feverishness of the electorate seeking salvation through the ballot box, on the other.

The people in Australia did not willingly accept the sacrifices demanded by financiers and economists. While the defeat of Mr. Lang seems to indicate a recognition of the economic disasters of his policies, the victories of Labour, opposing the Premiers' Plan even where they applied it, indicated that a large number of Australians were opposed to economies and were hoping for a way out of the depression through improving standards. Fear and hysteria defeated Lang, not any belief in the correctness of the theory behind the Premiers' Plan. Without the discovery that certain changes in the Constitution gave a coercive power to the Commonwealth and to an extra-parliamentary body, it is very improbable that the Premiers' Plan would have been accepted so

quickly and comparatively easily. The Loan Council dominates the Australian scene. Banks through the Loan Council stopped unlimited governmental borrowings; they demanded and were given explicit assurances that the various governments were shaping and supervising the details of administration in accordance with the Plan. The *Sydney Morning Herald* stated: "It is believed that members of the Bank Board informed Mr. Scullin of their determination to hold the Governments strictly to the conditions of the Premiers' Plan and that the Board would require a full periodical disclosure of the various Governments' accounts before further advances would be made." The comment of an eminent legal authority, Mr. Norman Cowper, is important: "For the purpose of policing the Plan, the Loan Council became a kind of super-government, directing the States and the Commonwealth when they should prepare and present their budgets, what lines those budgets should follow, and even (it is scarcely too much to say) where and how economies should be made."[10] Not merely did the result of the Financial Agreement of 1927 impose limits on the borrowing powers of the States, but it provided the Commonwealth with a very effective weapon for coercing New South Wales, whose government tried to pursue an independent policy with regard to oversea interest payments. If the community realized the power obtained by the Loan Council, we may conclude that it had lost faith in simple democracy, but the people were more concerned with the fears of national bankruptcy, which, they believed, they had escaped because of the control exerted over Lang. The Labour minority rationalized the Loan Council as a useful enough instrument of democracy fallen under

[10]Norman Cowper, *Studies in the Australian Constitution*, Sydney, 1933, pp. 136-7.

the influence of private financial interests. The people want security more than democracy. During the Lang *régime* the State Savings Bank had to close its doors: if this was democracy, many believed that financial control would be better. So New South Wales in 1933 voted by referendum for an alteration of the Upper House, aimed frankly at hindering, if not at preventing, the passing of Labour legislation.

One must not assume from this result that the days of state intervention are over. While Mr. Lang's successor has hindered the working of state enterprises, he has introduced transport controls which subordinate private-motor traffic to the interests of the state railways. Votes will still be given only for reforms.

The activities of the Loan Council have produced from the Left a determination to transfer financial control to the government, and from the Right a determination to prevent any drastic schemes of socialization. There is a wide feeling, even outside the Labour party, that the financial institutions are exerting too much influence. The agitation for the adoption of the Douglas Social Credit proposals is very loud and insistent, gaining strength daily, not because the people study the details of the involved theories and schemes, but because they are attracted by the emotional appeal of a complete solution through financial juggling. Banks have openly attacked the Douglas schemes and the proposals for nationalizing the banks. However sound the terms exacted by the Loan Council may have been, they were enforced against the wishes of the government of the day. They meant that the governments were unable to carry out their promises to the people, but since the electorate would accept no excuses, they meant that a government could be rendered futile and be defeated because the real decision rested with the Loan Council.

Mr. Cowper believes that the Financial Agreement is a curb upon a radical government in the States: "The banks, especially the Commonwealth Bank, can by no means escape Mr. Theodore's soft impeachment that they attempted to dictate the financial policy of the Australian governments. The Premiers' Plan was largely a policy forced by the banks upon the governments, through the Loan Council, and by means of the provisions of the Financial Agreement."[11] Yet the people kept on turning out governments. In New South Wales, Lang defeated Bavin and was defeated by Stevens. During the depression Labour won and lost power in the Commonwealth, lost in Victoria and South Australia, and won in Queensland and West Australia.

So the restlessness and the disillusionment of the community expresses itself neither in a withdrawal of the state from economic activities, as Dr. Benham would advise, nor in a comprehensive scheme of social planning, but in a violent swinging of the political pendulum and in an intensified criticism of the immediate political control. Every government in Australia that has faced the electors since the depression, except that of Tasmania, has been defeated. Although there has arisen in New South Wales a Fascist organization, the Australian still puts his faith in the democratic right to demand assistance from the state, but he has become more fickle in his choice of the people who are to control the state. Despite the education of the economists, the electorate does not believe that Australia is susceptible to external conditions, and it still seeks for the political party that will solve unemployment. Further, in West Australia the electorate not merely returned a Labour government in 1933, but voted very decisively for secession from the Commonwealth

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

Few now seem to be much worried by the proposed deficits. No one believes that budgets will be balanced during the depression; financing by Treasury bills has been rationalized into a useful form of investment in such a time. Australia has carried through successful conversions, and money is so plentiful that the rate of interest has been gradually reduced. Fixed deposits increase, and governments which are remitting taxation keep going to the banks for loans. The Premiers' Plan and the theory behind it must be regarded, in part at least, as a piece of economic opportunism to put a brake on deficits, to stop a form of direct inflation, and to control the Labour party. When the economists are asked in view of events since the Plan, why the budget had to be balanced under Labour governments and not under non-Labour governments; why social services had to be cut to some extent, but not enough to eliminate all deficits; why the Theodore inflation would have been disastrous, but exchange inflation and Treasury-bill inflation have kept up purchasing power; why wages had to be cut ten per cent., but not enough to remove economic disequilibrium—they can only reply in terms of generalities and political expediency.

Meanwhile unemployment is slowly decreasing and there is a moderate renewal of confidence. Prices of wool have considerably improved, and the seasons are still good. The unemployed are kept alive at a miserable standard, but the government of New South Wales, instead of increasing the scale of relief payments, is lowering taxation as an aid to recovery. Many call this recovery; many say that the Premiers' Plan has saved Australia; but the clergy, the trade unionists, the Labour party insist on drawing attention to the degrading life of many unemployed.

— REVIEWS —

A NEW FIELD IN PHYSICS*

FRANK ALLEN

THE development of the various branches of physical science has never proceeded from well-defined beginnings to deliberately chosen ends. At first it was impossible to discern either a beginning or an end. On the contrary, investigation progressed from commonplace observations to intimately related phenomena. Like Abraham of old, the primitive scientists went out not knowing whither they went. In the last three centuries the desultory character of ancient scientific observation has indeed been superseded by a systematic search for the basic causes of natural phenomena. But the horizons of knowledge seemed continually to recede as investigation advanced, and while the new horizons were quite as alluring in their promise of finality, the promise once more proved illusive.

One or two illustrations will make this point clear. The aggregations of matter in planets, sun, and stars, seemed ever to grow larger as more definite knowledge was secured, until some bodies forty times as massive as the sun have been located in the heavens. Even though there is some indication that stars have generally the same order of magnitude so far as their mass is concerned, it is always possible that among their countless numbers one may be found in which these apparent limits will be far exceeded. When in the contrary direction matter is subdivided, it is found to consist successively of minute

*_The Phenomenon of Superconductivity_, edited by E. F. Burton, University of Toronto Press, 1934.

crystals, molecules, atoms, electrons, and protons, in a swiftly descending scale of smallness which irresistibly suggests Dean Swift's celebrated zoological epigram:

> So, Naturalists observe, a Flea
> Hath smaller Fleas that on him prey,
> And these have smaller still to bite 'em,
> And so proceed *ad infinitum*.

In the less material sphere of undulatory motions, atmospheric and water waves, varying from a small fraction of an inch to many feet in length, are found, while the lengths of other waves employed in radio-broadcasting are measured in hundreds or thousands of yards, to which there is no necessary upper limit. In the opposite direction, ether waves of continually decreasing length are found in the infra-red heat radiation, visible light, ultra-violet light, X-rays, and gamma rays, with apparently no limit of smallness.

Similarly, temperatures are found ranging from hundreds of degrees to thousands or millions (and even to calculated temperatures for the interiors of stars of eighty millions of degrees) without discernible limit. But heat gives clear evidence of being a form of molecular energy, and, since relativity imposes a limit on the velocity of particles equal to the velocity of light, there must consequently exist an upper limit of temperature though its value does not seem to have been calculated.

In all these cases the imagination is wearied in a futile attempt to discover some final limit upon which it may at last find rest. But when we turn to the scale of low temperatures, the theory of heat indicates a temperature at which the motions of molecules would cease and the last vestiges of temperature vanish. Experiment has shown the absolute zero of temperature to be almost exactly 273 degrees below zero on the centigrade scale.

Below this absolute zero even the imagination cannot go.

The absolute zero having been definitely calculated, efforts were soon made to reach it by the method of liquefaction of gases. The so-called permanent gases of the atmosphere for a time resisted all efforts to reduce them to a liquid condition. But in 1877, oxygen, nitrogen, and air were liquefied in the form of a transient mist, and a little later a small quantity of liquid oxygen was obtained. Since then, progress has been rapid, and low temperatures of −183° Centigrade for oxygen, −253° C. for hydrogen, and finally about −271° C. for helium, have been successively attained. In 1926 it was theoretically shown that the sudden destruction of the magnetic condition in certain substances would lower their temperatures. Several of these materials were thereupon cooled in helium to 1.26 degrees above the absolute zero, and then, by suddenly destroying their magnetism, a temperature of only one-twelfth of a degree above the absolute zero was reached. The long journey to the absolute zero is, therefore, all but finished. In this one direction in science finality is practically attained.

The properties of matter form a large portion of physical science. Every known property of matter except its mass, and for a few substances their radio-activity, alter with temperature. With comparatively few exceptions these properties have been studied only through the narrow range of the easily attainable temperatures of ordinary life. The properties of matter at excessively great extremes, both high and low, still remain to be investigated. As the upper extremes exist inside the sun and stars, their influence is conjectural only through precarious mathematical reasoning. The lower extreme is now available, though in but very few laboratories in the world.

For many years Leiden in Holland was the only place where the lowest temperatures could be reached, and there, under Professor Kamerlingh Onnes, helium was first liquefied and frozen, and the lowest temperatures attained. During the War, Professor McLennan persuaded the British Admiralty to undertake the search for the light non-inflammable gas helium, to replace the dangerous hydrogen in balloons. A plant to separate helium from natural gas was erected and operated in Calgary under the supervision of Mr. John Patterson, the present Director of the Meteorological Observatory. A large quantity of helium was thus obtained; but before it could be used for its designed purpose, the War terminated. Professor McLennan then proceeded to construct an elaborate low-temperature laboratory in the Physics Building at the University of Toronto, and with the generous assistance of the British Admiralty, the National Research Council of Canada, and the Carnegie Foundation of New York, the plant, which was the second of its kind in existence, produced liquid helium in 1923. Since that time plants for the liquefaction of helium have been established or projected at Berlin, Washington, Cambridge, and in California; but up to the present the Toronto Cryogenic Laboratory, next to that in Leiden, has been the most prolific in low-temperature research.

It was discovered by Onnes that at the temperature of liquid helium, solid mercury and lead lost all their resistance to the flow of electricity through them. To this remarkable phenomenon he gave the name of *superconductivity*. This peculiar property of matter at very low temperatures has been especially the subject of wide research by Professor McLennan and several of his associates. So extensive have these researches become that Professor Burton, the present Director of the Mc-

Lennan Laboratory, has deemed the time opportune to gather them together in book form. In this task he has enjoyed the assistance of a very capable band of investigators, Messrs. Barnes, Wilhelm, Pitt, Grayson Smith, Allen, and Young, who have co-operated in presenting various phases of the extraordinary property of superconductivity.

Though the work is presumably of composite authorship, there seems to be no suggestion anywhere of diverse literary style, and the material has all been skilfully woven together so as to present unity of plan and execution. There is also complete freedom from typographical errors. Quite appropriately the work is dedicated to Professor McLennan. Within the brief compass of one hundred and twelve pages a very satisfying treatment of the subject has been accomplished, which, though designed for the technical student of physics, is also in large part quite within the grasp of anyone who desires a knowledge of superconductivity as far as its investigation has at present gone.

There is first presented a statement of what superconductivity means, followed by a concise chapter on the general subject of the measurement of low temperatures, especially of those extending to the absolute zero. Then comes a chapter describing the ingenious methods by which the frigid temperatures of liquid air have been attained, and especially those in which the peculiar thermal behaviour of expanding hydrogen and helium has been circumvented. For before hydrogen can be liquefied it must first be cooled in liquid air, and before helium can be reduced to liquid form it must in turn be cooled to the temperature of liquid hydrogen. A plant for liquefying helium, therefore, requires similar plants for liquefying both air and hydrogen. Helium is consequently one of

the most precious, as well as evanescent, of liquids. The layman who has wondered just how low temperatures are attained and measured will find here the veil of mystery lifted.

Then follow three chapters, which form the distinctive part of the book. They deal successively with: (1) the superconducting elements, of which there are eleven, and superconducting alloys and compounds, which now number about fifty, and whose components, oddly enough, are not always superconducting; (2) superconductivity in the presence of high-frequency alternating currents; and (3) changes in the properties of substances at the sharp transition temperature at which superconductivity occurs.

The final chapter contains a critical discussion of the theories which have been proposed to account for the superconducting state. Since the equations proposed are given in the text, Professor Burton might with advantage have also included their derivation so that reference to works dealing with the theory of electrons might have been unnecessary.

Though no theory of superconductivity meets the requirements of experimental research, it has become clear that any conception of a current of electricity as an indiscriminate flow of vast numbers of electrons among the atoms of metals like the passage of a swarm of insects among the trees of a forest, will have to be abandoned. Evidently current-flow involves a precise electronic mechanism which has extraordinary stability in most metals for all temperatures down close to the absolute zero, and suddenly collapses in a very few superconducting substances.

Some idea of the magnitude of superconducting power may be grasped from the statement that a flat ring of one

alloy, of which the metallic rim was one-third of an inch wide and one-sixth of an inch thick, could carry at the temperature of 1.2 degrees above the absolute zero no less than fifty thousand amperes of current, and if the ring were continuously immersed in liquid helium, the diminution of current with time would be so small that at the end of five years sufficient would remain to ring a door-bell.

In the Toronto laboratory attention has also been given to compounding alloys which have high, instead of low, superconducting temperatures, with the result that the highest temperature yet found—about ten degrees above the absolute zero—for the appearance of this phenomenon, has been discovered. This fact suggests the possibility, it is feared a remote one, that an alloy with superconducting power at ordinary temperatures might ultimately be developed, a discovery which would revolutionize those methods of generation and transmission of electric energy which are now developed on so vast a scale.

ECONOMICS FOR DEMOS*

H. A. Innis

The interest created by the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association has served to

**Canadian Problems as seen by Twenty Outstanding Men of Canada*, Oxford University Press (papers delivered at the Conservative Summer School, held at Newmarket, 1933).

The Liberal Way, a Record of Opinion on Canadian Problems as expressed and discussed at the First Liberal Summer Conference, Port Hope, September, 1933, J. M. Dent and Sons.

Recovery by Control, a Diagnosis and Analysis of the Relations between Business and Government in Canada, by Francis Hankin and T. W. L. MacDermot, J. M. Dent and Sons.

The Definite National Purpose, by W. H. Moore, Macmillans in Canada.

Contributions to Canadian Economics, vol. VI, 1933, University of Toronto Press.

Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, vol. V, 1933, Jackson Press (Kingston).

stimulate conferences dealing chiefly with economic subjects; and with the prospect of elections, political parties have been quick to note the general trend. The post-war period has been characterized by the emergence of the conference, first as a result of the exhaustion and then of the reviving idealism subsequent to the War. Still more recently, the conference idea has been losing prestige in Europe coincidently with the coming of age of the War generation and the growth of the youth movement. In Canada, on the other hand, the conference movement has been quickened by the fresh interests of youth and also by the depression.

The published proceedings of political summer schools, in spite of, or because of, careful editing fail to convey the warm atmosphere of the meetings. Genial conviviality shines from the references to banquets and from the photographs in the Liberal publication. One of the *best* addresses of the Conservative school (by Mr. Earl Lawson) was omitted, while what must obviously have been a *worst* speech was included in one volume, and from the other it is enough to select one choice statement: that "every time a man acquired a new language he was developing a layer of brain cells, so that if he could speak fourteen languages or thirty-two languages, it really meant that he had developed that many layers of brain cells." That refuge of weak minds the *argumentum ad hominem* is conspicuous, and in both volumes, to quote one speaker, "parrot cries are heard on all hands." Both parties have been careful to suggest that they do not assume responsibility for the conclusions advanced in the various papers, and it is difficult to isolate underlying policies. At the Conservative school arguments were presented against the wheat agreement, and at the Liberal school in favour of it. Professor R. M. MacIver's

statement that "the liberal seeks to discover and keep the good and remove the evil" does not differ from the emphasis of Mr. Bennett and Mr. Macaulay on Tennyson's lines,

> That man is the true Conservative
> That lops the mouldered branch away.

French Canada was represented at both schools. Women were not present at the Conservative meetings. Speakers at Newmarket were drawn largely from members of governments, especially that of the Province of Ontario, and were limited to Canadians, whereas at Port Hope, British, Americans, and Chinese were included, and some members of the provincial party were noticeably absent. In each case the personnel largely explains the general tone of the published proceedings. The foreigners (who spoke at Port Hope) could not be expected to throw much light on Canadian problems; and the ministers (who spoke at Newmarket) were concerned too intimately with immediate domestic problems. The Conservative volume lays emphasis on planning whereas the Liberal does not.

In the main both books leave an impression of failure to understand the crucial problem of Canada and its implications. Substantial and important papers by economists and political scientists were, indeed, included; but the outlook which they represented did not extend beyond these isolated contributions, and the result is merely a lack of unity. The Conservative volume omits references to banking and corporate finance, the Liberal to the civil service, and the latter is weak on transportation. In each there appears an excellent paper on the British North America Act and its implications in federal-provincial relations. The Conservative proceedings entitled *Canadian Problems as seen by Twenty Out-*

standing Men (the ethics of reviewing, if not modesty, requires that I should correct this number to nineteen) shows little appreciation of the underlying unity of Canadian development and of the necessity of relating each contribution to *the* Canadian problem. It is the tale of nineteen wise, blind men reporting accurately on the respective parts of the elephant with which they have come in contact. These papers are important and valuable as contributions to anatomy, but an accurate description of the elephant's whiskers throws little light on the state of his pulse. Perhaps we should not expect unity from summer schools. On the other hand, one cannot avoid commenting on the inevitable mental indigestion of the students.

Let us turn to a discussion of a direct assault on the problem as a whole such as is produced by Messrs. Hankin and MacDermot and by Mr. Moore. Partly because the first volume is a joint product and partly because neither of its authors is an economist, we may consider at greater length the book by Mr. Moore, a man with a training in economics and a wide background of experience in private and governmental activities. Not that *Recovery by Control* does not include a valuable account of the extent and character of government intervention throughout the range of economic activity in Canada, but its approach is not that of the economist. We are grateful to Mr. Moore for his determined attempt to present an exposition of *laissez-faire* economics suitable for an economically illiterate public. In the process of popularization accuracy has been sacrificed: Communist Russia is persistently referred to as *socialistic* and the recovery in Australia has been entirely disregarded. There is, however, a wholesome emphasis on the importance of flexibility in an economy based on the export of

raw materials. Mr. Moore has little faith in governmental intervention and advocates a return to economic liberalism. With Mr. Bennett he is sceptical of the efficiency of democratic control, but Mr. Bennett argues for more efficiency whereas Mr. Moore argues for less control.

The problem of Mr. Moore's book is fundamental to economics. As one of the best efforts to discuss the subject with the public, its failure is illuminating. It is impossible to discuss the increasingly complex problems of economics with the untrained, as it is impossible to discuss the (actually less difficult) subjects of mathematics or physics. The attempt inevitably leads to vagueness, to moral platitudes, or to statistical sandbagging. An important phase of *the* Canadian problem is the marked decline in standards of living of the wheat-growers of the Prairie Provinces and of producers for export in other areas such as the Maritime Provinces: a country cannot endure half slave and half free. Mr. Moore has thrown no light on the causes of the problem, nor has he given any helpful suggestion as to how the problem can be attacked. He fails to realize that economic liberalism and political liberalism flourished in a period of economic expansion incidental to the opening of new land. The task of determining what pressure an increasingly rigid structure has on exposed industries, particularly wheat-production, presents a challenge to Canadian economists which can only be met by a most determined and persistent attack calling for all the skill which they can command.

Appraised in relation to this problem the various books under review are of little assistance, and in even some well-intentioned cases the conclusions would probably do more harm than good. I am sufficiently im-

pressed with the difficulties to understand the point of view of those who insist that the old solutions of political adjustment are alone adequate, but I have sufficient faith in the science of economics to believe that the ultimate solution can be proposed by it alone. But solution of the problem assumes the persuasion of a democracy, which means, in terms of counting of heads, the more densely populated regions of Eastern Canada. Immediate advantages seized upon by the East may ultimately do more harm than good to the Canadian economy if they involve an increase in the burden on Western Canada. It is extremely difficult to elaborate measures insuring a balance of interests, and perhaps even more difficult to secure their adoption.

A discussion of the effects which proposed measures will have on Western Canada provides the touchstone of their merit. Reduction of prices in Eastern Canada, whether brought about by application of machinery under the Combines Investigation Act, or by the reduction of the tariff, or by the action of departmental and chain stores, is advantageous to Western Canada. On the other hand, these measures must be considered in relation to disadvantages to the East. With present and prospective price-levels of wheat, an increase in the price-level of Eastern Canada—whether brought about by an increase in the tariff, combines, recovery based only on Eastern development, monetary policy, public works, or social legislation—is in the main disadvantageous to Western Canada. Measures responsible for readjustment of debt, including tax-machinery, loan-councils, and those measures which are designed primarily to raise the price of wheat, including monetary policy, are advantageous to Western Canada and in the main to the whole of Canada. It is the task of the economist primarily to devise methods

of easing the weight of the paralysing burden of debt in Western Canada and of increasing Western purchasing power. Measures tending to improve the equilibrium between Eastern and Western Canada will be to the advantage of Canada as a whole.

The task of mobilizing economic intelligence and of applying conclusions is the most urgent of our time. In one of the volumes under discussion, a former minister of railways actually advocates increased immigration as a solution for the railway problem, in spite of all the work done during the past decade by economists, such as Carrothers, Swanson, and MacGibbon, to emphasize the very serious limitations of this policy! There is perhaps the consolation that the repository of economic knowledge which has the greatest influence with governments, namely, the civil service, was scarcely represented at the summer schools and that the problem is at least matter of serious concern to the Prime Minister. Finally, in the *Contributions to Canadian Economics* and in the *Papers* of the Political Science Association there are indications that an important body of economic knowledge is slowly being built up, but even here the necessity of discussing practical problems as the only means of eliciting interest implies something inadequate in the audience addressed. On the other hand, the attempt to reach a very narrow audience of trained economists necessitates ample support from such organizations as a university press or a scientific society, but no support offers greater returns from the standpoint of national health.

JOHNSON'S ENGLAND*

A. S. P. Woodhouse

A decade ago, when Mr. Walpole remarked on the increasing contemporary interest in, and sympathy for, the eighteenth century, he ran little risk of being reminded that Queen Anne was dead. That would no longer be the case to-day. The reaction in favour of the despised century has reached even the lecture-halls devoted to English literature, and its praise is perhaps already becoming as tiresome (though not, I think, as unintelligent) as the earlier condemnations. Be this as it may: a gain in understanding, even if it runs to some excess, is a permanent acquisition, and the eighteenth century need never again fear the gross injustice from which it has suffered in the past. It would be pleasant (but irrelevant) to trace the history of the long eclipse, to chronicle some of the sillier sayings of the Romantics and Victorians (none surpasses Hazlitt's description of Dryden and Pope, the masters of the *artificial* style, as opposed to Milton—of all people—the master of the *natural*), and to pay tribute to such heretics as Stephen and Courthope and Austin Dobson, who dared to praise the century—though not always for the right things. One may, however, relevantly observe the contribution to the better understanding of the eighteenth century made in our own day by the Oxford Press. It begins with Sir Walter Raleigh's best book, his *Six Essays on Johnson*, published in 1910. Though Johnson's own works had been neglected (and in consequence ignorantly reviled), he had kept his hold on the English mind and heart, through the pages of Boswell. He offered, then, an obvious *point d'appui* for the rehabilitation of the

*_Johnson's England: An Account of the Life and Manners of his Age_, edited by A. S. Turberville, Oxford University Press, 2 vols.

century: if a generation could be got to appreciate the real Johnson, it would understand his age. "To picture him against the background of any other century is unthinkable: he belongs inevitably and completely to the eighteenth." And in Raleigh, Johnson, at least, found his almost perfect critic, devoted to, but not obsessed by Boswell. The next landmark was the publication, in 1926, of the *Oxford Book of Eighteenth Century Verse*, edited by Mr. Nichol Smith, which put the century in the enviable position of being the only period, beside the Victorian, to receive one of the celebrated Oxford books of poetry. And now comes *Johnson's England.*

The two sumptuous volumes, profusely illustrated and written by scholars of recognized standing, are designed as a companion to the already-famous *Shakespeare's England* (1916). As this examination proceeds, some serious reservations will have to be made: let us at the outset say that *Johnson's England* is the not-unworthy culmination of a worthy effort, and one for which every student of the eighteenth century and every admirer of that great age must be sincerely thankful. It may not be the book one had hoped for; but it is a mine of information, and it is in outlook essentially sane, touched at every point by the sobering influence of accurate scholarship. In the past the eighteenth century has sometimes suffered at the hands of its friends: they have presented it as a golden age of security and freedom from modern cares, a perpetual masquerade, a world of picturesque costumes and polished phrases, a delicate exotic which time has taken away. This is the work of the idyllic imagination carrying the spirit of romanticism into the enemy's stronghold! Very different is the note struck by Professor Trevelyan on the first page of *Johnson's England:*

> . . .A more illuminating picture of the eighteenth century would be supplied by a vision of something more robust—Clive planted four-square across the breach of Arcot; Wolfe and his men scrambling up the precipitous forest track towards Quebec; Captain Cook's sails sweeping into Botany Bay; Wesley's lean face and long white hair, as he preaches to mass meetings of miners and throws powerful men into fits of hysteria; James Watt working in the instrument-maker's shop, with thoughts in him that shall have their consequences in the history of mankind.
>
> . . .The eighteenth-century English, on the average, were an earnest, virile, original, unconventional, and energetic race. They practised self-help and individualism before the Victorians, but without bothering to write books about those virtues. That a man must help himself, seemed to them too natural to remark upon. If he did not, who else was to help him? Unless, indeed, he were cousin to a lord, or had a vote in a rotten borough, in which case the lord would provide. If they were to meet us, our eighteenth-century forefathers would, I shrewdly suspect, regard us as the decadents, with our grandmother, the State, running about after us all day long.

This is admirable, and the tremendous vitality here challenged for the eighteenth century is substantiated by the accounts of its multifarious activities that follow.

Johnson's England carries us into the thick of these activities. There are few generalizations and fewer opinions: what we are given is a mass of facts and figures, with much illuminating quotation from original sources. The result is often a vividness and immediacy of impression scarcely to be gained on any other plan. But the method has its dangers. At its best, Johnson's England (in its surface aspects) comes alive for us. At its worst, it is not only dead but buried—under an avalanche of facts. Sometimes one feels that the best writers are labouring at a disadvantage. Mr. Nichol Smith has to give some account of *all* the newspapers that flourished (or languished) in Johnson's London: the unavoidable

result is a desert of forgotten names—gazettes, chronicles, advertisers—which baffles the intelligence and defies the memory. (What a relief to come at last on the one London daily to survive, that gallant old reprobate, the *Morning Post*, "high-spirited and tory"—then as now!) Nor can it be denied that the premium set on detail has clogged many pages with facts which are trivial or irrelevant—or both. In the chapter on "Agriculture and Rural Life" we learn to know the more famous breed-cattle of the century by name: " 'Shakespeare' was calved in 1778. . . . [H]e was the outstanding bull of a generation. . . . His sire was Bakewell's bull 'D', who was twice a grandson of Twopenny, and his dam was a daughter of Twopenny. . . ." This is typical. The biographers (of the parish-register variety) and the bibliographers are not much behind the agriculturist—whose facts, however, have a certain admitted relevance not always discernible in theirs. Inevitably there is some very dull writing; for example, that in the chapter on "Travel and Communications" where the reader sinks under the weight of ill-arranged detail, or the chapter on "Sports and Games" which is a mere catalogue. On the other hand, there is much excellent writing—many happy devices by which detail is turned to the purposes of vividness, as in the chapter on "The Interior of the House" where Hogarth's *Marriage à la Mode* is made to yield information on the subject, and in the Hammonds' first-rate chapter on "Poverty, Crime, Philanthropy," where the literature of the century (*pace* Professor Stoll) is turned to particularly good account. But everywhere detail crowds out ideas or hampers their development.

One cannot read far without inferring that the editor of *Johnson's England* cares nothing for ideas. He sets out to provide "An Account of the Life and Manners of the

Age." Everything turns on one's definition of the word *life*. Is it mere outward spectacle and mere practical activity, or does it include the vital currents of thought and feeling which give the spectacle significance and inform much of the activity and constitute a main legacy to the next age? In these volumes a great deal that is of capital importance is simply omitted. And no adequate effort at co-ordination is made. Professor Turberville's planning is conventional and uninspired: it would hardly be too much to say, incompetent.

Never was philosophical speculation more vigorous in Britain than in the eighteenth century. But save for one chapter on science there is not a single section devoted to the period's thought. Has Professor Turberville never heard of Sir Leslie Stephen's classic? The conspiracy of silence seems to extend even to incidental references. Berkeley is mentioned—in connection with tar-water; Hume that we may hear what he was paid for the *Treatise;* Butler in reference to dissenting academies; Hartley for a casual comment on scientists; Adam Smith several times, but never in relation to his ideas. It is the same wherever we look. The chapter on the Church, for example, gives an excellent picture of its practical activities, but no account of its theology. Here is the celebrated age of prose and reason bereft of its reason—and, as presently appears, of its prose as well. We have a chapter on printing and the book-trade, but of literature itself no word is spoken. Surely in estimating the eighteenth century what Goldsmith wrote is of more importance than what Goldsmith was paid. No single group—not the empire-builders nor the inventors—left a more enduring achievement than Johnson's own group, the men of letters. How is one to account for the omission of literature from *Johnson's England*? Has Professor Turber-

ville never encountered Oliver Elton's *Surveys*? The other arts, it is true, fare better. There are chapters on Painting, Sculpture, and Music, and an admirable chapter by Mr. Geoffrey Webb, on "Architecture and the Garden." In this division, too, there occurs the one effort at co-ordination—an ineffective effort but lively and interesting in itself—Mr. Osbert Sitwell's chapter on "Taste." But the omission of thought and literature, and especially the literature of thought, is a defect that nothing can repair.

In the first place, it means the omission of those very aspects of his age with which Johnson is most indissolubly connected. Several of the writers in *Johnson's England* pay a perfunctory and uneasy reverence to the title in their opening words, but are constrained to admit that Johnson seems to have paid little attention to the department of life which they have been commissioned to discuss. Why *Johnson's* England?—that question repeatedly forces itself upon the reader. It is accentuated by the omission of the very things which most interested Johnson in his England and in life. The omission has a second result. We have complained of the almost total absence of any effort at co-ordination. What is really required is one chapter, or even a series of chapters, directed to that end. A French scholar planning the volumes would have known how to provide for them; the English mind is at its weakest here—witness that standing monument to the principle of muddling through, *The Cambridge History of English Literature*. But given the capacity to co-ordinate, eighteenth-century literature, including and emphasizing the literature of thought, provides an important aid. Here the ideas which dominate the period are disengaged from their accidental accompaniments and given more unequivocal expression

than they ever are in active life. We have spoken of the currents of thought and feeling in Johnson's England. No doubt they are cross currents, like those isolated by Professor Grierson in the seventeenth century; and, as Professor Grierson well knew, the place to look for them is in the literature of the age or in the literature and the life read in relation to each other. There are hints of these currents in the chapters already provided, in the accounts of science, of education, of taste, of the arts, of philanthropy, of voyages and discoveries. The missing chapters on literature and on thought would have provided many more, even if the chapters were not, as they might well have been, directed specifically to this end. Then an effort could have been made to gather the scattered hints together and present them in an ordered form, and in that effort a part at least of Johnson's England would have emerged co-ordinated and significant. But without an adequate treatment of literature and thought the effort at co-ordination would have proved abortive; and in fact no such effort is made.

One cannot in the compass of a brief review even suggest the lines that this effort would follow. One would have to take account of what may be called the main traditions of English thought and culture. One would have to define Neo-classicism not as a moribund theory of art and literature, but as a view—and a way—of life, the eighteenth-century representative of Renaissance humanism. Nowhere can this essential aspect of the matter, which is so often concealed, be better studied than in Johnson, whom it is not ridiculous to mention in the same breath as More, Colet, and Erasmus. One would have to recognize the alliance of this humanistic tradition with certain forces and institutions in the national life—with the forces of order rather than the

forces of reform: with the English aristocracy, a very different thing from the French, with the great educational foundations, where contact with the classical sources of humanism was never wholly lost, with the Established Church, which, despite its many failings, never wholly abandoned an instinct for the rational and the humane. Opposed to this complex humanism, of which Johnson himself is the best and fullest example, are other forces and other alliances. The Renaissance did not give birth only to modern humanism; it also gave birth to those forces which were to disengage themselves and coalesce anew into the naturalistic opposition to humanism. Modern naturalism has taken many forms, though most of them can ultimately be grouped (as Professor Babbitt suggested) under one of two heads: the scientific and the sentimental. In Johnson's day the struggle of naturalism and humanism was progressing under different guises and on many fronts. Johnson himself was the uncompromising champion of the humanistic tradition. It went down to defeat, and naturalism in its triumph produced the chaotic world of thought and feeling, art and action, in which we live to-day. No student who pretends to an interest in this world, and especially in modern England, can afford to neglect its origins in the eighteenth century. But the scene there revealed is highly complicated and not yet exhaustively explored. In the attempt at co-ordination—a tentative co-ordination designed merely to clarify and with no pretence of being final—one would have to recognize other forces and alliances besides those already mentioned. One would have to recognize, for example, the rising influence of the middle class and see in how many ways its habit of mind was opposed to the humanistic tradition with its alliances, classical, aristocratic, conservative, Anglican. One would have to

watch the gradual formation of a tradition very different from the one in which Johnson stood: a tradition with Nonconformity in the place of Anglicanism, democracy in the place of aristocracy, the eclectic curriculum of the dissenting academies in place of the old concentration on classical studies, and with a general tendency to the radical instead of the conservative. One would have to examine the interaction of the two traditions certainly, but one would have especially to ask how far the new forces apparent in English thought and feeling, in art, and in practical reform, found encouragement and a temporary home in this second tradition which was fully emerging in Johnson's day. . . .

On these and kindred matters *Johnson's England* is silent.